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This paper examines whether public equity firms and private equity firms with public debt 
exhibit different degrees of real earnings management, defined as the manipulation of 
operational activities in order to influence reported earnings. Public equity firms face intense 
capital market scrutiny that their private equity counterparts do not. Therefore, this study’s 
comparison of the two types of firms provides insight on the impact of capital market pressure on 
real earnings management behaviors. The impact of capital market pressure is not clear ex ante. 
On the one hand, the scrutiny associated with the public equity markets may play a disciplining 
role that leads firms to refrain from activities that distort reported earnings. On the other hand, 
the penalties faced by public equity firms that fail to meet earnings benchmarks may put 
additional pressure on top managers to report positive and improved earnings and hence, may 
lead to greater distortion of reported earnings through the manipulation of operational activities. 
Consistent with the latter possibility, I find that public equity firms are more likely than private 
 
equity firms to opportunistically alter normal operations to improve earnings by cutting R&D 
spending, by pushing sales through discounts and promotions, and by lowering costs of sales 
through overproduction. I find no difference in abnormal discretionary expenses between public 
equity and private equity firms.  
Although private equity firms with public debt do not face the same capital market 
pressure that public equity firms face, they are not immune from incentives to engage in real 
earnings management. Specifically, I find that private equity firms with public debt engage in a 
greater degree of real earnings management as their debt moves closer to default. Given that debt 
claims become more like equity claims as a firm’s debt moves closer to default, this finding 
suggests that public debtholders exert similar pressure to public equity holders when their claims 
become more equity-like. Moreover, private equity firms with public debt that do engage in real 
earnings management appear to emphasize the zero earnings benchmark, consistent with prior 
research, suggesting that this benchmark is of primary importance to creditors.  
In addition, I assess the performance implications of capital market-induced real earnings 
management, by examining its association with one-year ahead industry-adjusted return on assets 
(ROA). I find that public equity firms that just meet earnings benchmarks while altering real 
operating activities suffer from lower future industry-adjusted ROA than private equity firms that 
just meet earnings benchmarks while altering real operating activities. The finding for the public 
equity firms validates concerns that operating decisions made in response to capital market 
pressure may negatively impact future firm performance. On the other hand, the results for 
private equity firms indicate that alterations of operating activities made in the absence of capital 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In a widely cited survey of corporate CFOs by Graham et al. (2005), more than two-
thirds of respondents said they would decrease spending on research and development, 
advertising and maintenance and one-third of respondents indicated that they would postpone 
investment in positive net present value projects in order to meet short-term earnings goals. This 
startling evidence raises the question of whether the stock market’s excessive focus on near-term 
earnings performance leads managers to make operational decisions in the short run at the 
expense of long-term performance — a concern that has been echoed by influential business 
leaders. 1  In this paper, I provide empirical evidence directly related to this question by 
comparing the tendency of public equity firms and a matched sample of private equity firms with 
public debt to2 meet earnings benchmarks through real earnings management3, defined as the 
manipulation of operational activities to influence reported earnings.  Prior research documents 
that firms engage in real earnings management to achieve various earnings targets (Baber et al. 
1991; Bartov 1993; Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2011; Chen 2009; Demers and Wang 2010). The 
availability of financial accounting data for public equity and private equity firms under SEC 
                                                 
1 For example, John Bogle (of Vanguard), Warren Buffett (of Berkshire Hathaway) and Lou Gerstner (ex-CEO, 
IBM) were signatories to the Aspen Institute’s call for an end to excessive short-termism in American business as 
set forth in Overcoming Short-termism: A Call for a More Responsible Approach to Investment and Business 
Management, Aspen Institute dated September 9, 2009. 
2 In this paper, I interchangeably use the terms private equity with public debt firms, private firms, and public debt 
firms. These terms mean that the firm has private equity, but has publicly traded debt. I also interchangeably use 
public firms, public equity ownership, and publicly held firms. They mean that firms trade equity publicly in stock 
exchanges. These firms may or may not have publicly traded debt. 
3 I use real earnings management, manipulation of real operating activities, real operating activities management, 
and alteration of real operations interchangeably in this paper. They mean a management’s action to alter reported 




reporting requirements allows me to test whether the greater capital market pressure faced by 
public equity firms contributes to this practice.  
The pressure associated with public stock markets is due to the fact that stock prices 
respond quickly to the release of new information such as earnings. An extensive stream of 
research shows that the capital market penalizes those firms with earnings that fail to meet 
important thresholds including: profits, growth and analyst forecasts (Penno and Simon 1986; 
Stein 1989; Beatty et al. 2002; Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 2002; Brown and Caylor 2005; Kasznik 
and McNichols 2002; Fischer and Stocken 2004; Givoly et al. 2010). Because stock prices are 
often a direct input into managers’ evaluations and compensation managers of public firms are 
concerned with how stock markets react to earnings releases and, therefore, face pressure to meet 
these benchmarks (Cheng and Warfield 2005).  
The impact of capital market pressure is not clear ex ante. On the one hand, the scrutiny 
associated with the public equity markets may play a disciplining role that leads firms to refrain 
from activities that distort reported earnings. Under this view, external investors demand high 
quality financial reporting to diligently monitor and discipline managers and managers of public 
firms respond to this demand by providing earnings reports that are more reflective of true 
financial outcomes than those of their private counterparts. Consistent with this perspective, 
Burgstahler et al. (2006) conclude that the capital market evaluates a firm’s overall reporting 
environment and improves earnings informativeness. On the other hand, public ownership of 
equity may increase managers’ reporting incentives to satisfy market expectations due to the 
penalties faced by public equity firms that fail to meet earnings benchmarks (e.g. Penno and 
Simon 1986; Stein 1989; Beatty et al. 2002; Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 2002; Brown and Caylor 
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2005; Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Fischer and Stocken 2004; Givoly et al. 2010). This 
additional pressure may lead to greater manipulation of reported earnings.  
Consistent with the latter possibility, Givoly et al. (2010) provide evidence that public 
equity firms engage in accruals management to a greater degree than do private equity firms, a 
finding that I corroborate for my sample. While this finding suggests that public equity firms 
may also have a greater tendency to engage in real earnings management to meet earnings targets, 
such a conclusion is not obvious because there are substantial differences between accruals 
management and real earnings management that justify a separate examination of real earnings 
management. In particular, the cost of executing accruals management and real earnings 
management is likely to differ. To the extent that firms have sufficient slack, managers are free 
to use permissible discretion to make advantageous accounting choices with little impact on 
other parts of the firm (Barton and Simko 2002). By contrast, real earnings management is 
potentially more difficult because re-orienting existing operations potentially requires 
coordination throughout the firm that may be hard to execute in immediate response to earnings 
goals. In addition, the implications of the two ways of meeting financial reporting objectives are 
different. While the direct impact of accruals management is only on reported earnings, real 
earnings management may impose actual costs on the firm to the extent managers depart from a 
strict long-term profit maximization objective when making operational decisions. Managers 
may make sub-optimal business decisions by changing the level and the timing of operating 
activities to deliver earnings targets. To the extent these changes affect the amount and volatility 
of current and future cash flows, the firm may subsequently suffer adverse business 
consequences (Yen 2008; Leggett et al. 2009). Moreover, the two forms of earnings management 
likely differ in the ease with which investors can detect them. Graham et al. (2005) report that 
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managers prefer real operating activities management to accruals-based earnings management 
since it is more difficult for outsiders to distinguish the firm’s optimal business decisions from 
abnormal and suboptimal operational decisions.  
My sample consists of 5,414 firm-years related to 882 private equity firms with public 
debt and 42,389 firm-years related to 5,805 public equity firms from 1987 through 2009. I focus 
on the following forms of real earnings management identified by Bushee (1998) and 
Roychowdhury (2006): (1) the acceleration of sales through aggressive sales discounts or lenient 
credit terms, (2) the lowering of the cost of goods sold by overproducing to spread fixed 
production costs over more units, (3) the reduction of discretionary expenses such as selling, 
general and administrative expenses and advertising expenses, and (4) the reduction of research 
and development expenditures, which must be expensed immediately but are typically expected 
to generate long-term benefits.  
I examine whether firms exhibit the above forms of real earnings management to a 
greater degree when they are in danger of failing to meet the zero earnings benchmark and the 
zero earnings growth benchmark, both of which have been shown to be important focal points 
for equity investors. I then examine whether private equity and public equity firms differ in their 
tendency to engage in real earnings management to avoid missing earnings benchmarks. I find 
that the public equity firms are more likely than private equity firms to opportunistically alter 
normal operations to meet earnings benchmarks by cutting R&D spending, by pushing sales 
through discounts and promotions, and by lowering costs of sales through overproduction. I find 
no difference in abnormal discretionary expenses between public equity and private equity firms. 
These results are robust to the inclusion of controls for various determinants of real earnings 
management as well as to various procedures designed to correct for the endogenous nature of 
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the firm’s status as a public or private firm including: (1) the Heckman two-stage correction, (2) 
propensity score matching techniques, and (3) intertemporal analysis for firms whose public or 
private firm status changed during the sample period. In addition, these results are robust to 
simultaneous equation model specifications based on Zang (2011) and Yang et al. (2010) that 
account for managers’ ability to jointly use accrual management and real earnings management 
to meet earnings targets. Collectively, the results suggest that exposure to the public equity 
markets is associated with a greater tendency to meet earnings benchmarks through the alteration 
of operational activities. 
Although private equity firms exhibit less real earnings management than public equity 
firms in response to potentially missing earnings benchmarks, they are not free from incentives 
to manage earnings (Coppens and Peek 2005). Specifically, Jiang (2007) shows that the zero 
earnings benchmark is particularly relevant for debt investors and that firms that fail to meet this 
earnings benchmark are punished in the form of higher cost of debt capital. Therefore, I examine 
whether private equity firms engage in a greater degree of earnings management in response to 
the zero earnings benchmark versus the zero earnings growth benchmark. I find that private 
equity firms with public debt engage in real earnings management to a greater degree in response 
to the zero earnings benchmark, consistent with prior research suggesting that this benchmark is 
of primary importance to creditors. 
In addition, prior research demonstrates that the payoffs to debt claims behave more like 
equity and that earnings become more relevant to debtholders as the debt moves closer to default 
(Coppens and Peek 2005; Easton et al. 2009). Hence, public debt investors in private equity 
firms with speculative debt may exert similar pressure to that exerted by public equity investors. 
To test this possibility, I examine whether private equity firms with public debt engage in real 
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earnings management to meet earnings benchmarks to a greater degree when the debt is 
speculative. I find that private equity firms with public debt engage in a greater degree of real 
earnings management as their debt moves closer to default, consistent with the notion that public 
debtholders exert similar pressure to public equity holders when debt claims become more 
equity-like. 
Further, I examine whether the use of real earnings management to meet earnings 
benchmarks is associated with future firm performance. I conjecture that public equity firms 
under capital market pressure are more likely to engage in real earnings management to just meet 
the market expectations while private equity firms alter their normal operations as strategic firm 
decisions. I use industry-adjusted ROA to measure firm performance. To test whether real 
earnings management affects future firm performance, I only consider firms that just meet 
earnings benchmarks either by using real earnings management or not. I find evidence that the 
public equity firms that just meet the short-term earnings goals while engaging in real earnings 
management experience more negative future performance while private firms that just meet 
earnings benchmarks while engaging in real earnings management do not. This may indicate that 
private equity firms’ deviations from their normal operations are more likely to be driven by 
strategic as opposed to opportunistic considerations. 
This study makes a number of contributions. First, it provides evidence directly related to 
the question of whether the stock market’s focus on short-term earnings performance affects a 
firm’s operational decisions. In this regard, this study is similar to concurrent work by Bharath, 
Dittmar and Sivadasan (2010) who examine whether the pressure of the stock market leads firms 
to make suboptimal operational decisions by examining the changes in plant productivity for a 
sample of public firms that go private. They find no changes in plant productivity once firms go 
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private from which they conclude that the public equity markets do not impair operational 
decisions. By contrast, I find that public equity firms do appear to alter their operations in the 
short-term more than private firms in response to the pressure to meet earnings targets. In 
addition, I find that alterations of operations made by public equity firms in apparent response to 
capital market pressure appear to negatively impact firm performance. The contrasting 
conclusions likely result from the fact that Bharath et al. (2010) examine realized performance of 
firms that go private but fail to consider managers’ incentives to use real earnings management 
to meet earnings benchmarks whereas I focus on future performance consequence of the firms 
engaging in real earnings management in order to just meet earnings benchmarks. 
Second, I extend Givoly et al. (2010) who examine the role of ownership structure on 
reported earnings. My finding that public equity firms engage in a greater degree of real earnings 
management to meet earnings benchmarks than private equity firms is largely consistent with 
Givoly et al.’s (2010) finding that public equity firms engage in a greater degree of accruals 
management to meet earnings benchmarks than private firms.  Third, I provide evidence on the 
circumstances under which private equity firms (with public debt) face earnings management 
incentives even in the absence of the pressure exerted by public equity markets. Specifically, my 
evidence that private equity firms engage in more real earnings management to meet benchmarks 
as their debt approaches default suggests that the public equity markets are not the only source of 
pressure for firms to meet earnings benchmarks. Finally, I demonstrate that real earnings 
management behavior in response to earnings benchmarks differs based on the importance of the 
benchmarks. Specifically, I find that private equity firms are more responsive to the zero 
earnings benchmark than are public equity firms, consistent with prior evidence that the zero 
earnings benchmark is most relevant for creditors.  
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My evidence that public equity firms appear to alter operations more extensively in 
response to earnings benchmarks than do private firms provides an interesting perspective on the 
stock market. While the primary role of capital markets is to efficiently allocate capital through 
prices, my findings raise the possibility that public equity markets may distort operational 
decisions to the extent managers consider factors other than net present value as they make these 
decisions.  
The paper proceeds as follows: I discuss the motivation of my study and develop testable 
hypotheses in the next section. Data and sample selection procedure and research design are 
discussed in Chapter 3, followed by descriptive statistics to present different characteristics 
among two types of the firms and the results of the empirical tests in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 





Chapter 2: Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1 The importance of earnings benchmarks in public equity markets 
Earnings is a highly scrutinized measure of firm performance, and is a common input in 
the managers’ performance evaluations. The literature discusses three benchmarks that serve as 
convenient focal points for investors in assessing firm performance: profits, growth over prior 
year earnings, and financial analysts’ earnings forecasts (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; 
Degeorge et al. 1999; Fischer and Stocken 2004). Prior studies demonstrate that the stock market 
rewards firms that consistently meet earnings forecasts (Kaznik and McNichols 2002; Bartov, 
Givoly and Hayn 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002; Brown and Caylor 2005) and disproportionately 
penalizes those firms that miss earrings forecasts (Skinner and Sloan 2002).  
Managers of firms with publicly traded equity have incentives to avoid the penalties 
associated with missing earnings benchmarks because a firm’s stock price performance has 
important compensation and career consequences for the manager. Specifically, executives’ cash 
and bonus payments are dependent upon firm performance (Gaver et al. 1995). In addition, as the 
equity market has expanded, a significant portion of executive compensation has become equity-
based (Babchuk and Grinstein 2005). 
Stein (1989) theoretically shows that as managers become more concerned about the 
stock price, they behave more myopically. Consistent with this notion, a substantial body of 
research on public equity firms has documented discontinuities in the distribution of reported 
earnings around key earnings benchmarks, with an abnormally high frequency of reported 
earnings just above versus just below the earnings benchmark of interest (Degeorge et al. 1999; 
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). Researchers cite this empirical regularity as evidence that 
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managers of public equity firms engage in income-increasing earnings management to avoid 
missing earnings benchmarks. (Beaver, McNichols and Nelson 2004; Dechow, Richardson, and 
Tuna 2003).4 
Earnings targets may be reached through accruals management, real earnings 
management, or both (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999; Roychowdhury 2006: 
Chen et al. 2010). Accruals management means making cosmetic changes in the books within 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) accounting choices without affecting firm’s 
real cash flows. Real earnings management is management’s intervention in a firm’s “normal” 
daily operations to meet the earnings benchmarks (Roychowdhury 2006). Beatty et al. (2002), 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2005) and Givoly et al. (2010) explore the impact of capital market 
pressure on firms’ tendency to use accruals management to meet earnings benchmarks. In this 
paper, I focus on the impact of capital market pressure on firms’ tendency to engage in real 
earnings management. In the next section, I discuss the trade-offs and relevant differences 
between accruals and real earnings management that justify a separate examination of real 
earnings management.  
 
2.2 The Trade-off between accruals management and real earnings management 
Real earnings management takes several forms. Specifically, firms may attempt to 
increase sales revenue by giving aggressive sales discounts and promotions or by relaxing credit 
policies. While sales discounts, promotions and lenient credit terms may increase revenue during 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, Durtschi and Easton (2005) document that discontinuity around zero is not explained by earnings 
management to avoid losses, but rather it is attributable to other factors such as deflation and sample selection 
criteria. They argue that discontinuity in earnings occur because deflator differs between the left and the right of 
zero, and encourage researchers to check to see if the deflator differs considerably between the left and the right of 
zero. I check the mean difference of beginning-of-the-year total assets which is the deflator I use in this study for my 
left of zero firms and the right of zero firms and find no statistically significant difference in means between firms 
that just miss profits and just meet positive income. 
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the promotion period, they may lead to a drop in sales volume in future periods as well as lower 
cash flows in the current period.  In addition, firms may decide to overproduce in order to spread 
out fixed production costs over more units, but bury the production costs in inventory at the end 
of the reporting period. This lowers the cost of goods sold per unit, increases margins, and 
ultimately raises profits in the current reporting period. However, overproduction results in lower 
cash flows due to higher production costs. Finally, firms may cut positive net present value 
projects or delay some discretionary expenses until later periods when earnings prospects are 
more favorable. Although curtailing such expenditures will boost current period earnings, it may 
have a negative impact on future performance if such expenditures are necessary for the firm’s 
long-run viability. Other studies examine different kinds of real earnings management such as 
strategic timing of asset sales (Bartov 1993; Gunny 2010). They argue that managers 
strategically choose the timing of asset sales to recognize realized gains from a sale of long-lived 
assets to meet an earnings target. When small losses or small earnings declines are expected, 
managers are more likely to be opportunistically deviate from normal operating practice to meet 
the earnings targets. 
Although Givoly et al. (2010) explore whether the capital market pressure faced by 
public equity firms affects their tendency to engage in accruals management in order to meet 
earnings benchmarks, I argue that there are a number of differences between accruals and real 
earnings management that justify my separate examination of real earnings management. A key 
difference between accruals management and real earnings management is that real earnings 
management directly affects the cash flows of the firm while accruals management is simply an 
inter-temporal shift of income that does not affect the operating activities of the firms. This 
difference affects the relative ease with which each form of earnings management can be 
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undertaken. To the extent that firms have sufficient slack, managers can make advantageous 
accounting choices within their discretion to inflate current year earnings (Barton and Simko 
2002). Moreover, the decision to engage in accruals management can be made at the end of the 
reporting period. On the other hand, real earnings management is more difficult because 
managers must predict the earnings performance earlier in the period and make operational 
decisions in anticipation of failing to meet various earnings goals. That is, real earnings 
management requires managers’ anticipatory decision making and coordination to execute 
alternative business options. 
There are limits on managers’ ability to engage in accruals management, however. They 
can only manage accruals when the balance sheet has sufficient slack to accrue additional 
amounts (Barton and Simko 2002). Using Barton and Simko’s (2002) measure of accounting 
flexibility, Wang and D’Souza (2006) find that firms with less accounting flexibility are more 
likely to cut R&D expenditures.  Moreover, accruals-based earnings management is more likely 
to be subject to auditor or regulatory scrutiny and is more likely to draw investors’ attention than 
real earnings management.  Hence, real earnings management becomes more appealing when the 
balance sheet is already at a point where accruals can no longer be managed (Barton and Simko 
2002) or when firms face other stakeholder constraints on their accruals management activity. 
For example, a recent study by Barton et al. (2010) find evidence that ethical firms manage 
earnings primarily through the alteration of real operating activities rather than through accruals 
manipulation. Their measure of corporate ethnical behavior is the involvement in corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) activities such as production of safe goods, care for environment and 
etc. Their argument is based on the notion that the earnings number that is produced as a result of 
accruals management is not a true representation of the firm’s financial position while earnings 
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that reflect the effect of real actions do represent the firm's true position. Cohen et al. (2007) test 
firms’ choices between real and accruals management of pre- and post-SOX periods and find 
evidence of a switch toward real earnings management due to tighter auditor and regulatory 
scrutiny after the passage of SOX. The empirical evidence provided by Cohen et al. (2007) is 
related to an analytical finding by Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) that tighter accounting 
standards reduce accruals management but increase costly real earnings management. Graham et 
al. (2005) provide survey evidence that managers often make business decisions that may deviate 
from a normal level of operations to meet short-term earnings goals since it may be difficult to 
find out whether managers make suboptimal business decisions. Because the costs of and 
likelihood of detection of real earnings management versus accruals management differ and 
because real earnings management has a direct impact on firms’ cash flows while accruals 
management does not, I examine the impact of capital market pressure on firms’ tendency to 
alter operations in order to meet earnings targets. 
   
2.3 Degree of capital market pressure by the firm’s ownership type  
Private firms with publicly traded debt face less capital market pressure than firms with 
publicly traded equity because their stocks are not publicly traded and executive compensation is 
not tied to stock price performance. Accordingly, Givoly et al. (2010) compare private firms with 
publicly traded debt to firms with publicly traded equity to isolate the impact of capital market 
pressure on managers’ accrual management behavior. I exploit the same setting to isolate the 
impact of capital market pressure on managers’ tendency to engage in real earnings management 
to meet earnings targets.  
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Although past research shows that public equity firms engage in more accruals 
management to meet earnings targets than private firms, it is not clear whether private and public 
firms will differ in their use of real earnings management to meet earnings targets. If the capital 
market creates earnings pressure for managers to be short-term oriented then private firms that 
are immune from such pressures may exhibit less real earnings management to meet earnings 
targets. Also, because private firms are on average smaller, less diversified, and have lower 
analyst following, their financial statements are the main source of information for outsiders. As 
a result, private firms may have greater incentives to produce more informative financial 
statements and, therefore, may engage in less real earnings management to meet earnings targets. 
On the other hand, public equity ownership requires more transparency and higher reporting 
quality since the market monitors the corporation more actively. If private firms face fewer 
constraints on their behavior because they do not face the active monitoring of the capital market 
then they may engage in more real earnings management to meet earnings targets. Consistent 
with this possibility, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Burgstahler et al. (2006) find that private 
equity firms produce less conservative and lower quality earnings reports in an absence of 
market demand for high quality financial statements and reduced regulatory requirements. 
 
2.4 Incentives to meet earnings benchmarks faced by private firms with public debt 
As discussed in section 2.3, my comparison of private firms with public debt to public 
equity firms is based on the fact that private equity firms do not face capital market pressure 
from public equity markets. Therefore, the comparison isolates the effect of capital market 
pressure on firms’ tendency to engage in real earnings management to meet earnings targets. 
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Although private firms with public debt do not face capital market pressure from the public 
equity markets, they are not necessarily free of incentives to meet earnings benchmarks.  
Prior research shows that, as in the equity market, bond markets respond to earnings news 
(Coppens and Peek 2005; Plummer and Tse 1999) and reward firms for meeting earnings 
benchmarks in the form of lower debt cost of capital (Jiang 2007). Therefore, private firms with 
public debt have incentives to report earnings that meet or exceed earnings targets in order to 
satisfy bond markets and minimize the cost of debt capital. Consistent with this notion, DeFond 
and Jiambalvo (1994) find that firms near a debt covenant violation tend to inflate earnings. 
The pressure to meet earnings targets to satisfy the bond market likely differs from the 
pressure to meet earnings targets in the equity market due to differences in the relevance of 
earnings in the two markets as a results of differences in the payoff functions of debt and equity 
(Coppens and Peek 2005; Jiang 2007; Easton et al. 2009). Specifically, shareholders focus on 
upside opportunities since their downside risks are limited to their investments, while their 
wealth for the upside potential is unlimited. By contrast bondholders, as fixed claimants, are less 
interested in upside potential and are mainly concerned whether the firm will survive and satisfy 
its financial obligations. Therefore, in contrast to its impact on shareholders, earnings are more 
relevant to bondholders as a firm’s financial condition weakens. Consistent with this notion, 
Plummer and Tse (1999) find that earnings are more informative to bondholders as bond ratings 
decline and as firms report losses, Similarly, Easton et al. (2009) find that the earnings are more 
informative for bondholders when the earnings news is negative for firms with speculative-grade 
bonds. Jiang (2007) finds that the firms with high default risks enjoy bigger benefits from 
meeting earnings benchmarks in terms of the cost of debt measured by credit ratings and bond 
yield spread than the firms with low default risks. Moreover, Jiang (2007) shows that, among the 
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various earnings benchmarks, bondholders are more interested in the firm’s ability to report 
positive income than in its ability to beat prior year income. Collectively, these studies suggest 
that the incentive for firms with public debt to beat earnings benchmarks rises as they approach 
default and that the loss avoidance benchmark is likely to be more important than the earnings 
growth benchmark for these firms. 
While the foregoing discussion establishes that private firms with public debt have 
incentives to avoid missing the zero profit target, particularly as they become more distressed, it 
leaves an open question of whether these firms will use real earnings management to meet these 
targets to the same extent as public equity firms. Differences between the two types of firms in 
the tendency to use real earnings management may arise because bondholders and stockholders 
may respond differently to the practice. Specifically, stockholders, who have a preference for 
risky projects (Jensen and Meckling 1976), may view real earnings management as impairing 
future financial performance while bondholders may prefer real earnings management to the 
extent that it conserves firm resources and reduces risky investment by delaying R&D or other 
discretionary expenditures, for example. Consistent with this notion, Ge and Kim (2009) find 
that, in contrast to prior findings that the stock market discounts earnings achieved through real 
earnings management (Mizik and Jacobson 2007), the bond market does not penalize firms that 
meet the earnings benchmarks through the manipulation of real activities such as sales, 
production or discretionary expenses. 
Bondholders’ view of real earnings management is likely to change as a firm moves 
closer to default and bondholder-shareholder conflicts become more pronounced. Specifically, 
bondholders may no longer view real earnings management as a desirable operating strategy 
when they are concerned that the inflated earnings and share prices that may result from real 
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earnings management may facilitate shareholder expropriation of wealth from bondholders via 
stock option awards (Ge and Kim 2009) or excessive dividend payouts (Ahmed et al. 2002).  
Consistent with this possibility, Ge and Kim (2009) show that bondholders request higher risk 
premiums for firms that achieve earnings targets through real earnings management when they 
expect potential wealth transfers to shareholders through stock options. This finding suggests 
that the degree of shareholder-bondholder conflicts affects the decisions of managers of private 
firms with public debt to manipulate operations in an attempt to beat relevant earnings targets. 
 
2.5 Consequences of capital-market induced real earnings management to meet 
earnings targets 
Several studies investigate the effect of real earnings management on future firm 
performance (Leggett et al. 2009; Gunny 2010). One stream of research supports the managerial 
opportunism hypothesis which states that managers decide to cut investment or expenditures at 
the expense of long-term performance in order to enjoy higher current stock prices or better 
compensation packages. For example, firms that meet earnings benchmarks through real 
earnings management suffer from subsequently lower earnings measured by return on assets and 
operating cash flows (Leggett et al. 2009), lower earnings growth (Yen 2008), and higher cost of 
equity (Kim and Sohn 2009). The capital market does not reward the firms that meet the earnings 
forecast through earnings management (Athanasakou et al. 2009).  
Alternatively, other studies find no negative future performance consequences to the 
practice of real earnings management in order to achieve earnings targets. These studies favor 
the operational efficiency hypothesis, which predicts that managers deviate from the normal 
levels of sales, production and investments for better future performance. Gunny (2010) finds 
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that the firms that meet the earnings benchmarks through real earnings management have higher 
return on assets compared to the firms that do not adjust real operating activities and miss 
earnings targets. Chen, Rees and Sivaramakrishnan (2010) compare future operating 
performance of firms that meet analysts’ forecasts through accruals management to firms that 
meet analysts’ expectations through real operating activities management. They find empirical 
evidence that those firms that meet analysts’ forecasts using real operating activities management 
rather than using accruals management outperform in the future.  
 I re-examine the impact of real earnings management on future financial performance by 
examining whether the practice has different consequences for firms that engage in the practice 
while under capital market pressure (i.e. public equity firms) versus firms that engage in the 
practice while insulated from capital market pressure (i.e. private equity firms with public debt). 
If the decision to alter operations in response to capital market pressure causes firms to deviate 
from a long-term profit maximization objective while similar decisions made in the absence of 
capital market pressure do not, then public equity firms should experience more adverse future 
performance effects from the practice than private firms. In a related study, Bharath et al. (2010) 
study whether earnings pressure of the stock market leads firms to make myopic decisions by 
examining the changes in plant productivity of firms that go private. They find no evidence that 
firms’ plant productivity improves after opting out of the public equity market from which they 




2.6 Hypothesis Development 
As discussed in Section 2.1, the capital market exerts pressure on firms to meet various 
earnings benchmarks. One way to meet these benchmarks is through the temporary alteration of 
firms’ operations. As discussed in Section 2.3, private firms with public debt do not face the 
same capital market pressure and, therefore, provide a suitable comparison group in order to 
isolate the effect of capital market pressure on firm behavior. To the extent capital market 
pressure leads firms to alter operations in order to meet earnings targets I expect this behavior to 
be more pronounced for public equity firms than for private firms with public debt. Accordingly, 
I test the following hypothesis, stated in the alternative form. 
  
H1: Public equity firms exhibit more real operating activities manipulation to meet  
      earnings benchmarks than private equity firms.  
 
As discussed in section 2.4, bondholders find earnings informative, particularly as firms 
gravitate toward default. Therefore, private equity firms with public debt, although immune from 
capital market pressure exerted by equity markets, have incentives to meet relevant benchmarks 
in order to satisfy bondholders and obtain a lower cost of debt capital. Therefore, I expect that 
the difference between public equity firms and private equity firms with public debt in their use 
of real earnings management to meet earnings targets to decline as the public debt of the private 
equity firms moves closer to default. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis, stated in the 




H2: The difference between public and private firms in the propensity to engage  
       in real earnings management  to meet or beat the earnings benchmarks  
       declines as the private firms’ publicly traded debt approaches default. 
       
 As discussed in section 2.4, Jiang (2007) and Coppens and Peek (2005) find that 
reporting a positive income is a more salient earnings benchmark for bondholders than reporting 
earnings growth. Based on this finding, private equity firms with public debt are more likely to 
tailor any earnings management activities they engage in around the profit benchmark than 
around the earnings growth benchmark.  This argument leads to the following hypothesis, stated 
in the alternative form.   
 
H3: Private equity firms with public debt are more likely to engage in real earnings  
       management to beat the profit benchmark than to beat the earnings growth    
       benchmark. 
 
As discussed in section 2.5, there is contrasting evidence on the future performance 
impacts of real earnings management to meet earnings targets. While some studies find that the 
firms that meet their earnings targets through manipulating real activities suffer from adverse 
future firm performance (e.g. Yen 2008; Leggett et al. 2009; Kim and Sohn 2009), Gunny (2010) 
argues and finds evidence that real earnings management to achieve earnings targets results in an 
efficient allocation of resources and thus, does not result in decreases in future firm performance. 
I examine whether real earnings management to meet earnings targets has different future 
performance implications when it occurs under capital market pressure versus when it does not. 
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That is, I compare the effects on future performance of the practice for public equity firms and 
private firms with public debt. If private firms with public debt engage in real earnings 
management primarily to efficiently allocate resources rather than in response to capital market 
pressure then such behavior should have less negative future performance consequences than the 
same behavior by public equity firms who are more likely to be responding to capital market 
pressure and, therefore, deviating from a long-term profit maximization objective. Therefore, I 
test the following hypothesis to examine differences between private equity and public equity 
firms in the consequences of meeting earnings targets through real earnings management. 
 
H4: Public firms that just meet the earnings benchmarks while engaging in real   
       earnings management suffer more from adverse future firm performance than do 
       their private equity counterparts that just meet earnings benchmarks while 
       engaging in real earnings management.   
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Chapter 3: The Model 
 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
The sample selection procedures are summarized in Table 1. My sample of firms is taken 
from Compustat for the years 1987-2009.5 I exclude financial institutions (SIC code 6000-6999) 
and other regulated industries (SIC code 4800-4900). Regulated industries often face conflicting 
incentives to report lower income (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). Typically, financial 
institutions are separately examined since their financial ratios and valuations metrics are 
different from general industries. The financial institutions’ loan ratio, adequacy ratio, and 
liquidity ratio are strictly regulated and that financial leverage, as well as receivables deflated by 
total assets, is not meaningful (Fields et al. 2004). Thus, their earnings management is highly 
dependent on regulatory oversight (Shen and Chih 2005). I further delete firms with missing 
variables of interests for my regression models. I restrict the sample to those firms with at least 
one stock price quote available on Compustat or CRSP for the period to be classified as public 
equity firm-years, or have an S&P senior debt rating6 available on Compustat (Faulkender and 
Petersen 2006; Givoly et al. 2010) to be classified as public debt firm-years. Following 
Berkovitch et al. (2006), I exclude firms with less than $50 million of total debt (sum of short- 
and long-term debt).7 This may bias my sample toward larger and more leveraged firms. The 
sample selection procedures result in a sample consisting of 47,803 firm-year observations and 
6,357 unique firms. 
                                                 
5 I limit my data to post-1987 since I want a more accurate measure of operating cash flows and accruals in the cash 
flow statement (Collins and Hribar 2000) and prior to 1987, cash flow from operations disclosed under Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 95 (SFAS 95 (1987)) is unavailable. 
6 When the S&P senior debt rating is not available, I considered an S&P rating on new debt issuance from Securities 
Data Company (SDC). 
7 Rating agencies rate all public debt issues with at least $50 million. Small fractions of debt less than $50 million 




[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Firms can go public with debt or with equity. Firms with publicly traded debt differ from 
firms with publicly traded equity in many aspects (Berkovitch et al. 2006; Givoly et al. 2010). 
Nonetheless, under Sections 13 and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, both types of 
firms are subject to the same financial reporting requirements and regulations. Firms that choose 
to access the public debt markets are relatively rare. Only about 17% - 20% of Compustat firms 
access the public debt markets (Faulkender and Petersen 2006).  
I classify firms into public equity and private equity (with public debt) firms. I classify a 
firm as a private equity firm with public debt if the firm has S&P senior debt rating and a non-
zero amount of debentures on Compustat and/or the firm has information on new debt issuance 
on Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Global New Issues database. Public equity firms have 
stock price quotes available during the current year t either on Compustat or CRSP. Table 2 
summarizes the representation of public equity and private equity with public debt in the sample. 
Private equity (public debt firm-years) firm-years comprise only about 11.3% of my sample8 
while public Equity firm-years comprise the remaining 88.7% of my sample. In this study, firms 
are classified as public equity firms if the firms publicly trade equity in a major stock exchange 
and these firms may or may not have publicly traded debt. Firms with access to public debt 
markets over my sample period are about 18% out of total observations on average.9 Public debt 
                                                 
8 The percentage of private equity firm-year observations out of total observations is 3.9% before restricting my 
sample to have at least $50 million of total debt, similar to the sample distribution in Givoly et al. (2010). They 
report that 3.5% of their firm-year observations are private equity firm-years. 
9 The percentage of firms with access to public debt markets consists of 18% of total observations before restricting 
my sample to have at least $50 million of total debt, Similarly, Faulkender and Peterson (2006) report that the public 
debt sample consists of about 19% of their total sample over the period 1986-2000.  
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is rare. Firms choose to go public with equity more than with debt (Faulkender and Petersen 
2006). However, public debt is becoming more common. 
Of the 47,803 firm-year observations of the final sample, I have 5,414 firm-year 
observations of 882 distinct public debt firms and 42,389 firm-year observations of 5,805 distinct 
firms with public equity. Panel A of Table 2 presents the percentage of private equity and public 
equity firm-year observations across the sample periods of 1987 and 2009. Panel B presents a 
sample distribution grouped by different real earnings management metrics. The sum of private 
firms and public firms may not be equal to the total number of firms since the firms can switch 
their firms’ status over the sample period. Panel C of Table 2 shows industry distributions (2-
digit SIC code) of the sample by ownership type. Panel D of Table 2 presents S&P debt rating 
categories for my sample firms. I partition sample firms with S&P credit ratings into the high 
default risk group if the firm has an investment grade rating (BBB- or above) and low default 
risk group if the firm has a speculative grade rating (BB+ or below). Of 26,996 firm-year 
observations with public debt, 42.44%10 of the observations are classified as being in the high 
default group. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
                                                 
10 Givoly et al. (2010) report that 53% of private equity firm-year observations have non-investment grade debt 
while 22% of public equity firm-year observations have non-investment grade debt. I have 45% of private equity 
firm-year observations with non-investment grade debt and 42% of public equity firm-year observations with non-
investment grade debt. Givoly et al. (2010) have the lower percentage of non-investment grade debt for public 
equity firms compared to my data because about 53% of their public equity firms with public debt do not have S&P 
senior debt rating. Excluding firm-year observations with non-rated debt, non-investment grade of public equity 
firm-year observations consists of 48%. High percentage of firms without S&P senior debt rating is due to the fact 
that they select firms with at least $1 million of total debt while I restrict the firms to have at least $50 million of 
total debt. Rating agencies issue debt ratings for all public debt issues with par values of at least $50 million. 
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I obtain an S&P credit rating data for the issuing firm from the Ratings section of Compustat 
North America Fundamentals Annual database.11 I use the public bond rating as a proxy for the 
firm’s financial distress (Plummer and Tse 1999). Where the firms have investment grade bonds 
(BBB+ or above), the firms have low default risk. Firms with speculative bonds are classified as 
high default risk firms. To test my second hypothesis, I require that the firm must have publicly 
traded bonds and must have S&P senior bond ratings data available in Compustat. For this 
reason, I use a subset of my sample to test my second hypothesis. I compare two groups of firms: 
private equity firms with public debt and public equity firms with public debt and exclude public 
equity firms without public debt from consideration.  
 
3.2 Research design 
3.2.1 Myopic R&D curtailment model 
To test whether the degree of real earnings management to meet the earnings thresholds 
differs by the firm’s ownership type, I investigate whether the firm’s propensity to engage in 
income-increasing real activities when facing small losses or small earnings decline relative to 
the prior year differs for public equity versus public debt firms. First, I focus on myopic R&D 
curtailment to avoid earnings disappointments as examined by Bushee (1998). I test whether a 
firm’s decision to cut R&D expenditures to meet earnings targets varies between public debt and 
public equity firms. Under earnings pressure, short-sighted managers may decide to cut R&D 
expenditures to improve short-term earnings performance because the benefits of R&D usually 
                                                 
11 Compustat has had S&P credit rating information available since 1985. S&P assigns long-term ratings for the 
issuer that measures a company’s ability to meet its financial obligations. S&P also assigns a debt rating to an 
individual debt issuance. 
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take a long time, often beyond their tenure (Dechow and Sloan 1991). Opportunistic decisions to 
cut R&D expenditures have been the subject of much research interest because it implies that the 
firm may be making sub-optimal operating decisions, sacrificing long-term value and growth 
prospects of the firm. I study how the degree of capital market pressure based on the firm’s 
ownership type influences a firm’s myopic behavior. The ownership type of the firm captures the 
degree of capital market pressure. 
 Managers are more likely to opportunistically cut R&D expenditures if they can meet the 
earning goals by doing so (Bushee 1998). The firm is suspected of managing earnings through 
myopic R&D curtailment if their pretax income reports small loss (Cheng 2004). Specifically, 
the firm is suspected of myopically cutting R&D expenditures if pretax incomet-1 < (pretax 
income + R&D expenditure)t ≤ (pretax income + R&D expenditures)t-1. An indicator variable, 
SUSPECT1, equals one if the firm-year belongs to the above category and, zero otherwise. If the 
sum of pretax income and R&D expenditures in the current year is larger than the sum of pretax 
income and the R&D expenditures in the prior year, then the firm has no incentive to cut R&D 
expenditures to report earnings growth. If the sum of pretax income and R&D expenditures in 
the current year is less than the pretax income of the last year, then the firm cannot meet the 
earnings growth benchmark with R&D cuts. The firm reports small positive earnings if its pretax 
income is just right of zero.  
Figure 1 presents the distribution of income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged 
total assets for near suspect firm-year observations. Earnings are divided into 30 intervals of a 
width of 0.005 over the range of - 0.075 to + 0.075 (Degeorge et al. 1999; Roychowdhury 2006; 
Givoly et atl. 2010).12 The 16th earnings interval where scaled earnings are just right of zero 
                                                 
12 Following the bin definition suggested by Degeorge et al. (1999), the bin width is calculated as 2*2(IQR)n-1/3, 
where IQR is the inter-quartile range of the variable and n is the number of observations. The bin width using the 
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includes suspect firm-years. (a) of Figure 1 presents earnings distribution for both public and 
private firms combined and (b) and (c) present earnings distribution for private equity firms and 
public equity firms, respectively. (a), (b), and (c) of Figure 1 show the discontinuity at zero.13 
However, it is apparent that small positive earnings are less frequent for private equity firms. 
Figure 2 shows the earnings changes distribution over the 30 intervals of a width 0.005 over the 
range of -0.075 and +0.075. Earnings change is the change in income before extraordinary items 
deflated by lagged total assets. Similar to Figure 1, the 16th earnings change interval contains 
firms with small positive earnings in the period. Figure 2 presents a significantly high frequency 
of small positive earnings changes for public equity firms. Private equity firms exhibit different 
earnings distribution behavior. Private equity firms show high occurrence of small earnings 
declines from the prior year. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 & 2 here] 
 
Firms that go public with their debt are different from firms that go public with equity. A 
firm’s choice to go public with their debt or equity is endogenous based on ex ante firm 
characteristics and affects firm’s policies and operating decisions. I use the Heckman (1979) 
two-stage approach to control for endogeneity of a firm with respect to going public with debt 
versus with equity. I compute an inverse Mills ratio for all sample firms. In the first stage, I 
estimate the Probit model using factors that are related to a firm’s choice of going public with 
                                                                                                                                                             
above formula for income deflated by lagged total assets and a change in income deflated by lagged total assets is 
0.007 and 0.005 respectively. I use single-bin-width of 0.005 in this study. The use of a bin width of 0.007 leads to 
statistically similar results. 
13 Durtschi and Easton (2005) argue that the discontinuity at zero is due to scaling. I examine earnings distributions 
of unscaled net income and changes in net income and still find earnings discontinuity at zero and zero earnings 
growth. Eurtschi and Easton (2005) suggest checking the distributions of a deflator between the left of zero and the 
right of zero. I compute the mean difference of lagged total assets between the left of zero and the right of zero and 
find no significant difference difference between two groups. 
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debt. Following several studies (Katz 2009; Givoly et al. 2010), I consider size of the firm, 
leverage, book value of equity, sales growth, return on assets, quick ratio, operating cycle, firm 
age, net operating loss carryforwards, the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets, 
and a loss indicator variable to compute an inverse Mill’s ratio for each firm.14 Then, I include 
the inverse Mill’s ratio as an additional control variable in the second stage.  
To test the relationship between capital market pressure and myopic investment decisions, 
I examine whether private equity firms are more or less likely to engage in income-increasing 
real earnings management than public equity firms. The dependent variable is one if the firm cuts 
R&D expenditures relative to the prior year and, zero otherwise.15 The logistic model takes the 
following form:  
 
Prob (CURTD) = β0 + β1PRIVATEi,t + β2SUSPECT1_PRIVATEi,t  
                                         + β3SUSPECT1_PUBLICi,t + β4SIZEi,t + β5LEVERAGEi,t 
                             + β6CSALES+ β7CCAPXt + β8PCRDi,t + β9CIRDi,t+ β10CGDPi,t  
                             + β11CFUNDi,t + β12FCFi,t + β13DISTi,t+ β14INV_MILLSi,t + εi,t          (1) 
    
where SUSPECT1 is an indicator variable that equals to one if firm-year shows small profits or 
small increase in earnings relative to prior year, and zero otherwise. PRIVATE is an indicator 
variable that equals one if the firm-year belongs to private equity-public debt category, and zero 
otherwise. SUSPECT1_PRIVATE and SUSPECT1_PUBLIC capture the difference in R&D 
curtailment between public equity firms and private equity firms. Control variables to control for 
                                                 
14 INV_MILLS equals the probability density function of the standard normal divided by the cumulative density 
function from the equation.  For private equity firms, inverse Mills ratio is λ(Z) = ϕ(Z)/Φ(Z) and for public equity 
firms it is λ(Z) = -ϕ(Z)/(1-Φ(Z)). 
15 I also used the difference between the current period R&D expenses and the 3-year average R&D expenses to 
smooth out prior year’s myopic R&D cuts. 
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firm characteristics and R&D investing environment are explained in the next section.  A finding 
that β3 > β2  would indicate that public equity firms are more likely to cut R&D to meet earnings 
benchmarks than private firms and would, therefore, support H1. 
 
3.2.2 Real earnings management estimation models 
Because current GAAP requires that R&D investments be expensed rather than capitalized, 
myopic managers have incentives to cut R&D expenses to meet the near-term earnings goal. 
However, managers may decide to manipulate other operating activities. Using Roychowdhury’s 
(2006) broader definition of real earnings management, I consider other real activities that are 
often used to improve earnings. Managers may choose to boost the current period’s sales to meet 
the earnings targets. Sales discounts and lenient credit terms temporarily increase sales volume 
and total amount of sales revenue, but result in lower cash flows per sales dollar. Following 
Roychowdhury (2006), I estimate the normal level of cash flows from operations (CFO) by 






























                                                (2) 
                                                   
where Asset is the total assets of the period t, Sales the total sales during the period t, and ∆Sales 
the change in sales relative to the prior period. Abnormal cash flow from operations is the 
difference between the actual value and predicted cash flow from operations using the estimated 
coefficients from the above equation (2).  
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 The firm may choose to overproduce to inflate earnings. Overproduction spreads the 
fixed costs over a larger number of units and reduces the cost of goods sold for the current year, 
but increases the margin for the given level of sales revenue. To estimate normal production 
costs, I first estimate the normal cost of goods sold (COGS) and normal level of inventory 

































































                                             (4) 
  
where COGS is cost of goods sold in year t, ∆INV is the change in inventory in year t relative to 
year t-1, ∆Salest-1 is the change in sales in year t-1 relative to year t-2 and Assett-1 is the change in 
total assets in year t-1 relative to year t-2. Using (3) and (4), I estimate normal level of 
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The abnormal production costs are the difference between the actual value and the normal value 
using the fitted values of the above regression. A higher abnormal value indicates the firm’s 
overproduction to lower COGS and inflates the current period earnings. 
 Firms facing small earnings decline or a small loss can meet earnings thresholds by 
cutting discretionary expenses. Consistent with Roychowdhury (2006), I define discretionary 
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expense (DISEXP) as the sum of selling, general, and administrative expenses, R&D expenses 
and advertising expenses. Similarly, I estimate the normal level of discretionary expense and 



























                                                              (6) 
  
 I test the real earnings management behavior of firms near earnings thresholds using 
abnormal levels of cash flows, production costs and discretionary expenses estimated from cross-
sectional regression equations (3), (5) and (6). The three measures are named as Abnormal CFO, 
Abnormal PROD and Abnormal DISEXP. In addition to the three real earnings management 
measures discussed above, I include one additional measure which is an aggregate of the three 
measures (Abnormal ALL) because the firm can alter more than one type of real activity 
simultaneously (Gunny 2010). In computing Abnormal ALL, I multiply Abnormal PROD by -1 
so that the negative value is associated with opportunistic overproduction. Then, I take the sum 
of Abnormal CFO, Abnormal PROD multiplied by -1 and Abnormal DISEXP. 
The firm is a suspect firm if the firm’s income before extraordinary item scaled by lagged 
total assets is between 0 and 0.005 (See Roychowdhury 2006). Roychowdhury (2006) classifies 
a firm-year observation as suspect firm-year when the income is just right of zero. In this study 
suspect firm-years also include those firm-years that report small earnings increases in the 
current year as compared to the prior year.  That is, the firm is also a suspect firm if the change 
of income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets is between 0 and 0.005. An 
indicator variable, SUSPECT2, equals one if the firm just meets zero or just beats the last year’s 
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earnings, and zero otherwise. To test the association between meeting the earnings benchmarks 
and real earnings management and how that relationship is influenced by ownership structure, I 
estimate the following equations:  
 
 Abnormal RM = ϒ0 +ϒ1PRIVATEi,t +ϒ2SUSPECT2_PRIVATEi,t  
                                      +ϒ3SUSPECT2_PUBLICi,t +ϒ4SIZEi,t + ϒ5LEVERAGEi,t +ϒ6ROAi,t 
              +ϒ7SALESGROWTHv+ϒ8NOAi,t +ϒ9LOSSi,t +ϒ10INV_MILLSi,t  
                    + ε i,t                  (7) 
 
where Abnormal RD is three measures of real earnings management estimated from (2), (5) and 
(6) and an aggregate of three measures: abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal 
production costs, abnormal discretionary expense, and an aggregate of abnormal cash flows, 
production costs and discretionary expenses. Regression equation (7) tests the degree of earnings 
management between private equity firms and public equity firms. Low values of Abnormal 
CFO and Abnormal DISEXP and higher values of Abnormal PROD indicate higher levels of 
income-increasing real earnings management. For Abnormal PROD, higher value is the result of 
real earnings management. A finding that ϒ3 < ϒ2 for Abnormal CFO, Abnormal DISEXP, and 
Abnormal ALL indicates that public equity firms alter operations to meet earnings benchmarks 
to a greater extent than private firms and would support H1. A finding that ϒ3 > ϒ2 for Abnormal 
PROD sample indicates that public equity firms are more likely than private equity firms to 




3.2.3 Propensity score matched-pair methodology 
Private and public equity firms exhibit different firm characteristics that may affect firm’s 
real earnings management behavior and thus it is important to control for the endogeneity of the 
decision to hold private versus public equity. To control for the effect of firm characteristics, 
industry and the year, I employ a propensity score matched pair methodology in addition to 
Heckman (1979). 16  Propensity score methodology assumes that firms that are similar in 
observable characteristics are similar in unobservable factors (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). The 
treatment group consists of the firm-years that have the private equity with public debt and the 
control group consists of those with publicly traded equity. Each treatment observation is 
matched to each observation with the closest propensity score in the control sample. In a logit 
model, I obtain a propensity score that is the predicted probability of the decision to hold private 
equity with public debt given firm characteristics such as size, leverage, sales growth, quick ratio, 
firm age, big5 audit firms, operating cycle and cash to total asset ratio. Then, I use the propensity 
score to match firms. I match each of the private equity firm-years with a firm-year in the public 
equity firm samples that is (1) in the same year, (2) in the same industry (2-digit SIC code), (3) 
have similar firm size and leverage, and (4) have the smallest propensity score difference. These 
procedures result in 4,484 pairs of the matched-firm years.  
                                                 
16 Francis and Lenox (2008) study selection problems in accounting research and suggest the propensity score 




3.2.4 Simultaneous equations model to test trade-off between accruals and real earnings 
management 
 Zang (2011) and Yang et al. (2010) both test the trade-off between two methods of 
earnings management using the simultaneous equations model. While Zang (2011) argues that 
firms in general prefer real earnings management, Yang et al. (2010) find that firms are more 
likely to use accruals management. They document that the managers choose between two types 
of earnings management based on the costs of such behavior (Zang 2011) and the firms’ abilities 
in using either or both types of earnings management (Yang et al. 2010). Besides costs of each 
type of earnings management and the firms’ abilities in using earnings management tools, I 
conjecture that the earnings distance from the actual earnings to the targeted earnings influences 
the firm’s trade-off decisions. In other words, I examine whether managers’ trade-off decisions 
between accruals management and real earnings management are related to the earnings 
performance of the firm that beat, meet, just miss, or miss earnings benchmarks. Managers are 
likely to use all the available earnings management tools when they believe that the earnings 
targets can be reached through earnings management. In contrast, if pre-managed earnings are so 
far from earnings goals that they cannot be reached with the use of available forms of earnings 
management, then the managers are less likely to aggressively manage earnings. In this case use 
of earnings management to reduce the gap between the actual and the target earnings, is likely to 
have less direct economic costs as well as less indirect costs in the form of regulatory scrutiny 
and litigation risk. Thus, accruals management and real earnings management are substitutes.  
To test whether a firm’s trade-off decision is affected by the earnings distance from the 
goals, I conduct the Hausman test separately for four earnings groups: beat, just meet, just miss 
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and miss firms. Firms are categorized as JUST MEET firms if (1) net income divided by total 
assets is greater than or equal to 0.005 but less than 0.005, or (2) the change in net income 
divided by total assets between t-1 and t is greater than or equal to 0  but less than 0.005. Firms 
are BEAT firms if (1) net income divided by total assets is greater than or equal to 0.005, or (2) 
the change in net income divided by total assets between t-1 and t is greater than or equal to 
0.005 and they are not categorized as MEET firms. JUSTMISS firms are the firms where net 
income divided by total assets is greater than or equal to -0.005 but less than 0, or (2) the change 
in net income divided by total assets between t-1 and t is greater than or equal to -0.005 but less 
than 0 and (3) they are not categorized and MEET or BEAT firms. 
Similar to Zang (2011), I examine the relationship between accruals management and 
real earnings management using simultaneous equations and test the endogeneity of real earnings 
management and accruals management with the Hausman test.  
 
 Abnormal RM= ϕ0 + ϕ1Abnormal Accrualsi,t + ϕ2PRIVATEi,t +ϕ3SUSPECT_PRIVATEi,t  
                          + ϕ4SUSPECT_PUBLICi,t + ϕ5∑Control Variable of RM 
                          + ϕ6∑Other Controls + ϕ6INV_MILLSi,t + ϕ8PRIVATEi,t*INV_MILLSi,t   
                          + υ i,t                                                                                                                                                            (a) 
Abnormal AM= λ0 + λ1Abnormal RMi,t + λ2PRIVATEi,t + λ3SUSPECT_PRIVATEi,t  
                          + λ4SUSPECT_PUBLICi,t + λ5∑Control Variable of AM 
                                        + λ6∑Other Controls+ λ7INV_MILLSi,t + λ8PRIVATEi,t*INV_MILLSi,t  
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                                         + νi,t                                                                                                      (b) 
                                                                                                   
The above equations are estimated using two-stage least squares. In the equation, Abnormal RM 
is real earnings management measures: Abnormal CFO, Abnormal PROD, or Abnormal 
DISEXP and Abnormal AM is discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones model 
(Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995). In the first stage, I regress each endogenous variable on the 
exogenous variables and then compute predicted values of abnormal level of real activities and 
abnormal level of accruals. The predicted values of the two regressions are used as endogenous 
variables in the second stage regressions. Other controls are firm-specific control variables 
including size of the firm, ROA, sales growth, and loss firm indicator variable. SIZE is computed 
as the natural logarithm of total assets and controls for the size effect on the earnings 
management. Firms with high ROA are profitable firms and are less likely to manage earnings. 
Growing firms are smaller firms and they are expected to engage in more earnings management. 
LEVERAGE controls the factors that are associated with private firms. LEVERAGE is expected 
to be positively associated with earnings management because high leverage is associated with 
more debt covenants violations (Press and Weintrop 1990). Financially troubled firms are more 
likely to engage in earnings management and an indicator variable, LOSS, controls for the firms’ 
financial distress. A firm’s decision whether to remain private or public is not random I include 
inverse Mills ratio and an interaction term of PRIVATE dummy and inverse Mills ratio for 
additional control variables to correct for potential self-selection bias in the simultaneous 
equations. I estimate the Probit model using factors that are related to a firm’s choice of going 
public with the debt size of the firm, leverage, book value of equity, sales growth, return on 
assets, quick ratio, operating cycle, firm age, net operating loss carryforwards, the ratio of 
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property, plant and equipment to total assets, and a loss indicator variable (Katz 2009; Givoly et 
al. 2010).  
 I use the modified Jones model suggested by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny (1995). Total 
accruals (TA) are calculated as follows: 
 
tjtjtj CFOEARNTA ,,, −= ,  
Where EARNj,t  is the earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations and 
CFOj,t is  cash flow from operations. I use accruals from cash flow data since accruals estimation 
from balance sheet can be less accurate (Collins and Hribar 2002). Abnormal accruals for firm j 






































where  ∆REVj,t is firm j’s change in revenues in year t and PPEj,t firm j’s gross value of property, 
plant, and equipment in year t. The industry- and year-specific parameters are then used to 

































Where ARj,t is firm j’s change in accounts receivable in year t. Then, abnormal accruals for firm j 















Then, the absolute value of abnormal accruals is the earnings quality measure. Larger absolute 
value of abnormal accruals indicates lower accruals quality. In other words, earnings quality is 
said to be lower when the absolute value of abnormal accruals is larger. 
Factors that influence real earnings management and accruals management differ (Zang 
2011). She argues that managers choose between accruals management and real earnings 
management based on the costs and benefits of two types of earnings management. Following 
Zang (2011), I consider proxies for the determinants of real earnings management such as Z-
score, RDindustry, HHI, and OVERPRODUCE. Altman’s Z-score measures the ex ante 
probability of distress (Graham 1996, 2000). A firm’s financial health can affect managers’ 
operating decisions. Managers’ concerns to survive under financial distress dominate reporting 
concerns (Graham et al. 2006). The Z-Score Model (Altman 1968) is calculated as follows: 
50.146.033.324.112.1_ XXXXXSCOREZ ++++=    
where X1 = working capital/total assets, X2 = retained earnings/total assets, X3 = earnings 
before interest and taxes/total assets, X4 = market value equity/book value of total liabilities, and 
X5 = sales/total assets. RDindustry is one if the industry is classified as an R&D intensive 
industry, and zero otherwise (Lev and Sougiannis 1996). High R&D intensive industries are 
chemicals and pharmaceutics (2-digit SIC code 28), machinery and computer hardware (2-digit 
SIC code 35), electrical and electronics (2-digit SIC code 36), transportation vehicles (2-digit 
SIC code 37), and scientific instruments (2-digit SIC code 38). Since earnings management using 
R&D is detrimental for their long-term well-being for R&D intensive firms, in a situation where 
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they can meet their earnings target by using either income-increasing R&D or income-increasing 
accruals, they are likely to use income increasing accruals for earnings management (Yang et al. 
2010). R&D intensive firms are likely to manage earnings using R&D much more cautiously as 
R&D management is costly for them (Roychowdhury, 2003). OVERPRODUCE is a measure of 
overproduction (Zang 2011). Overproduction cost is lower where the firm’s fixed cost of the cost 
of goods sold portion is high. OVERPRODUCE is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to 
total sales. The level of competition is related to the cost of deviating from optimal operation 
levels. I expect that a firm in a more competitive industry bears a higher cost of deviating from 
an optimal business strategy. I use Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to proxy for market 








2 ,  
where Sijt is the market share of firm i in industry j at time t. Market share is computed using 
sales of the firm in Compustat. I use 4-digit SIC codes for industry classifications. The HHI is 
widely used measure of industry concentration. The high value of the HHI indicates high 
industry concentration or less market competition. The HHI is closer to zero for industries 
consisting of huge numbers of small firms of relatively equal size and increases as the number of 
firms in industry decreases and the firms. size is dispersed. 
Proxies for the factors that influence accruals management are SOX, LITIGATION, 
NOA, and BIG5. BIG5 is one if the company is audited by big 5 audit firms, and zero otherwise. 
Big five audit firms are likely to be more experienced, have more resources and have more 
reputation at risk. Therefore, big five audit firms are likely to diligently monitor and discipline 
managers. Empirical evidence shows that big audit firms are associated with lower levels of 
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discretionary accruals (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 1998). Based on 
evidence provided by Cohen et al. (2007) of a switch toward more real earnings management 
than accruals management due to tighter auditor and regulatory scrutiny after the passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), I include SOX, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the fiscal is 
2002 and later and, zero otherwise. NOA is a measure of a bloated balance sheet (Barton and 
Simko 2002). Barton and Simko (2002) argue that net operating assets capture the degree of the 
bloated balance sheet. Firms with higher NOAs are more constrained in their ability to manage 
earnings upwards through accruals. I measure NOA as net operating assets scaled by the current 
period sales. Firms operating in high litigation risk industry face more scrutiny from investors 
and auditors and thus, they are less likely to use discretionary accruals to inflate earnings. 
Consistent with prior research (Francis et al. 1994; Soffer et al. 2000; Ali and Kallapur 2001), I 
use an industry dummy variable (LITIGATION) to identify firms in high litigation-risk 
industries: biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836), computers (SIC codes 3570-3577 and 7370-
7374), electronics (SIC codes 3600-3674), and retailing (SIC codes 5200-5961).  
  
3.2.5 Zero earnings benchmark versus zero earnings growth benchmark 
In regression equations (1) and (7), I classify firm-year observations as suspect firms 
when the earnings just beat the zero earnings benchmark or the zero earnings growth benchmark. 
To test Hypothesis 3, I further divide suspect firm-year observations into two different earnings 
benchmark categories: zero earnings benchmark and zero earnings growth benchmark. In doing 
so, I examine the relative importance of the two earnings benchmarks for private equity firms 
and for public equity firms. MEET_ZERO2 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has 
small pretax income, and zero otherwise. MEET_LAST2 is an indicator variable equal to one if 
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the firm has a small increase in earnings compared to the prior year, and zero otherwise. In order 
to investigate the likelihood of real earnings management to meet two different earnings 
benchmarks by private equity firms and public equity firm, I run the following two regressions 
separately: 
 
Abnormal RM = ϒ0 + ϒ1PRIVATEi,t +ϒ2MEET_ZERO2_PRIVATEi,t  
   +ϒ3MEET_ZERO2_PUBLICi,t  + ϒ4SIZEi,t + ϒ5LEVERAGEi,t   
    +ϒ6ROAi,t +ϒ7SALESGROWTHi,t +ϒ8NOAi,t + ϒ9LOSSi,t 
    + ϒ10INV_MILLSi,t + εi,t                  (8)        
                                                         
Abnormal RM = ϒ0 + ϒ1PRIVATEi,t +ϒ2 MEET_LAST2_PRIVATEi,t  
   +ϒ3MEET_LAST2_PUBLICi,t + ϒ4SIZEi,t + ϒ5LEVERAGEi,t  
    +ϒ6ROAi,t + ϒ7SALESGROWTHi,t+ϒ8NOAi,t + ϒ9LOSSi,t  
  + ϒ10INV_MILLSi,t + εi,t               (9) 
                                                                     
3.2.6 Real earnings management and firm’s financial distress 
To test H2 I use a bond rating as a proxy for a firm’s financial distress and its default risk 
(Plummer and Tse 1999). Credit rating agencies consider various aspects of the firm when they 
issue the credit rating for the firm. Standard and Poor’s (S&P) issues a credit rating for a firm 
after evaluating several aspects of business risks and financial risks (Standard & Poor’s 2008). 
S&P assesses industry risk, evaluates management, and analyzes a firm’s competitive position. 
S&P also evaluates overall financial risk by reviewing financial policy, profitability and capital 
structure and asset valuation. Additionally, off-balance sheet items such as operating leases, 
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guarantees, and other contracts and obligations are examined prior to issuing bond ratings. Bond 
ratings are positively associated with reported earnings (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond 
2006; Ziebart and Reiter 1992) and corporate governance (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and 
LaFond 2006). Firms with better earnings quality receive more favorable credit ratings and have 
a lower cost of debt (Ahmed et al. 2002). Evidence shows that firms with poor ratings and at risk 
of covenant violations are more likely to inflate earnings (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Credit 
rating agencies rate firms near a debt covenant violation poorly and those firms are more likely 
to inflate earnings as compared to firms with good credit ratings (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994).  
To test the relation between the firm’s financial distress and real earnings management 
and to test the relation between real earnings management and the public equity ownership under 
financial distress, I use an indicator variable (DEFAULT) equal to one if the firm has an 
investment-grade rating (BBB- or above) from S&P and zero, otherwise. S&P ratings measure 
the financial strength of the firm (Plummer and Tse 1999; Easton et al. 2009). Since this test 
requires a firm to have an S&P senior debt rating, public equity firms with private debt are 
excluded. I run equation (7) separately for high default risks firms and low default risks firms.  
 
3.2.7 Time-series analysis 
Private firms with publicly traded debt may decide to go public with equity. Appendix A 
presents an example of a firm that originally had private equity and public debt, but later issued 
equity to the public. Since my study examines whether capital market pressure from public 
equity ownership leads to more or less real earnings management to meet earnings targets, I 
study the changes of firms’ real earnings management by comparing the extent of real earnings 
management to meet earnings targets before and after public equity offerings. To examine 
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whether a firm that changed its status from a private equity firm to a public equity firm increases 
earnings management through real operating activities manipulations to meet or beat earnings 
benchmarks, I run time-series analysis comparing real earnings management behavior prior to 
and subsequent to initial public offerings. My sample of firms is smaller than other initial public 
offering studies since I only consider those firms that initially were private equity, but had 
publicly traded debts, and subsequently issued public equity. I examine abnormal levels of cash 
flows, production, and discretionary expenses for years -4 to +3 relative to the event year. The 
event year is 0 in the year of the public equity offering. I divide sample firm-years around the 
public equity offerings into four periods to examine short-term and long-term changes of 
earnings management behavior (Bharath 2010). In so doing, I have a control sample that consists 
of firms that publicly traded debts and have never issued public equity over the sample period 
from 1987 to 2009. I conjecture that firms that went public engage in more real earnings 
management to meet earnings targets. Specifically, I predict that those firms that issued public 
equity show positive abnormal production costs, negative abnormal operating cash flows and 
abnormal discretionary expenses to meet earnings benchmarks. I run the following regression 
model to study private equity firms’ (with public debt) pre- and post-public equity offerings and 
its influence on real earnings management to meet the short-term earnings goals: 
 
Abnormal RM = ϒ0+ϒ1SUSPECTi,t +ϒ2BEFORE_LT + ϒ3BEFORE_ST  
                          + ϒ4AFTER_ST +ϒ5AFTER_LT+ϒ6SUSPECT*BEFORE_LT  
                          + ϒ7SUSPECT*BEFORE_ST + ϒ8SUSPECT*AFTER_ST  
                          + ϒ9SUSPECT*AFTER_LT + ϒ10SIZEi,t + ϒ11LEVERAGEi,t   
                          + ϒ12ROAi,t + ϒ13SALTESGROWTHi,t + ϒ14NOAi,t +ϒ15LOSSi,t  
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                          +εi,t                                  (10)                           
 
where BEFORE_LT is one for 3 or 4 years before public equity offerings, BEFORE_ST is one 
for years of 1 or 2 years before public equity offerings, and zero otherwise. AFTER_LT is one 
for the 2-year period of 2 and 3 years after public equity offerings and AFTER_ST is one for the 
event year and for the one year immediately after the public equity issuance.17 I interact these 
dummy variables with an indicator variable SUSPECT318 to examine before-after changes of 
earnings management through real operating activities manipulations for suspect firm-years. If 
public firms are more likely to engage in real earnings management, then coefficient on 
SUSPECT3_AFTER_ST (ϒ8) and SUSPECT3_AFTER_LT (ϒ9) are expected to be significant 
and negative for Abnormal COF, Abnormal DISEXP, and Abnromal ALL groups, and should be 
significant but positive for Abnormal PROD group. Findings that ϒ6 > ϒ9, ϒ7 > ϒ8, and (ϒ6 +ϒ7 
> ϒ8 +ϒ9) for Abnormal CFO, Abnormal DISEXP and Abnormal ALL indicate that public 
equity firms engage in real earnings management to a greater extent than private firms and would 
support H1. For Abnormal PROD sample, findings that ϒ6 < ϒ9, ϒ7 < ϒ8, and (ϒ6 +ϒ7 < ϒ8 +ϒ9) 
indicate that public equity firms are more likely than private equity firms to opportunistically 
overproduce in order to inflate current period income. 
 
3.2.8 Consequence of real operating activities management for public and private equity firms 
If managers opportunistically adjust normal levels of sales discounts and promotions, 
production, and investments to meet their near-term earnings goals, then one may expect that 
                                                 
17 As discussed in Bharath (2010), it is not clear whether the event year should be considered part of the post-public 
equity issuance period or not.  
18 I use 1% as a cut-off   instead of 0.5% for classifying suspect firm-year observation since it is based on the bin 
width equation suggested by Degeorge et al. (1999). 
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firms subsequently suffer from adverse operating performance as a result of suboptimal business 
decisions (Leggett et al. 2009; Sohn and Kim 2009). Here, I examine the consequence of meeting 
earnings targets while altering operating activities management by focusing on those firms that 
just meet the earnings benchmarks. I study how both the incidence and the extent of real 
operating earnings management affect these firms’ future performance. First, I examine whether 
future operating performance is affected by firms that meet their earnings thresholds through real 
activities management (RM) or not. Second, I test whether the extent to which real earnings 
management affects subsequent firm performance differs between public and private equity 
firms.  
To examine whether real earnings management affects future firm performance, I only 
consider firms that just meet their earnings goals. To determine whether these firms engaged in 
substantial earnings management I divide Abnormal CFO, Abnormal PROD, Abnormal DISEXP, 
and Abnormal ALL into quintiles (Gunny 2010). If the firm-year observation is in the lowest 
residual quintile for Abnormal CFO, Abnormal DISEXP, and Abnormal ALL, or in the highest 
residual quintile for Abnormal PROD, then the variable RM is one, and zero otherwise. I 
measure a firm’s future performance using an industry-adjusted ROA at year t+1. ROA is 
income before extraordinary items deflated by lagged total assets and this value is subtracted 
from industry mean based on the firm year and the industry (2-digit SIC code) to compute 
industry-adjusted ROA.  
Because private equity firms with public debt in this subset of the sample have 
significantly more negative ROAs at year t-1 and year t (descriptive statistics results not 
tabulated) compared to public equity firms’ ROAs, I use the propensity score matching 
methodology to allow fair comparison. I match each of the private equity firm-years that are in 
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the suspect category with a firm-year in the public equity firm samples in the suspect category 
that are (1) in the same year, (2) in the same industry (2-digit SIC code), (3) have ROA within ± 
25% difference, and (4) have the smallest propensity score difference. These procedures result in 
660 pairs of the matched-firm years. To test whether real earnings management affects future 
performance and to examine whether the firm’s ownership type exerts an influence, I estimate 
the following equation:  
 
 AdjROAi,t+1 (Adj. CROAi,t-1, i,t+1)  = ϒ0 + ϒ1PRIVATEi,t + ϒ2 RM_PRIVATEi,t 
                                                            + ϒ3RM_PUBLICi,t + ϒ4SIZEi,t + ϒ5LEVERAGEi,t 
+ ϒ6AdjROAi,t+ ϒ7SALES_GROWTHi,t 
+ ϒ7LOSSi,t + εi,t                                                   (11) 
 
where RM t is one if a firm’s abnormal cash flows and abnormal discretionary expenses is in the 
lowest residual quintile from equations (2) and (6) and abnormal production is in the highest 
residual quintile from equation (5), and zero otherwise. PRIVATE is one if the firm had privately 
held equity, and zero otherwise. All other variables are as defined earlier. If real earnings 
management while meeting benchmarks has more negative consequences for firms engaging the 




3.3 Control variables 
I include several control variables that are likely to influence a firm’s degree of real 
earnings management, some of which are the same variables used in the first stage model to 
capture the characteristics of the private equity with public debt firms. I measure the size of the 
firm (SIZE) as the natural logarithm of total assets to controls for the size effect. I control for the 
firm’s profitability by including return on assets (ROA), which is income before extraordinary 
items divided by lagged total assets. I include sales growth (SALES_GROWTH) to capture firm 
performance.  
Firm’s incentives to manage earnings may be related to firm’s sales growth 
(SALES_GROWTH). Firm’s sales growth can also be a proxy for a firm’s life cycle stage. 
Higher sales growth is likely positively associated with higher growing firms (Anthony and 
Ramesh 1992). LEVERAGE controls for the firm’s factors that are associated with private equity 
(with public debt) firms. Private equity firms are more leveraged than public equity firms. 
Leverage (LEVERAGE) is measured as the ratio of the firm’s total debt to total assets. Firms’ 
investment decisions can be affected by the level of the total debt that is likely to be subject to 
covenants from bondholders. Leverage is expected to be positively associated with real earnings 
management and can be a proxy for the degree of shareholder-bondholder conflicts because 
shareholder-bondholder conflicts increase with leverage (Ahmed et al. 2002).  Shareholders of 
leveraged firms have incentives to make risky investments to transfer wealth from bondholders 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). Internal fund (INTFUND) represents the internal funds available 
for expenditures and projects. INTFUND is a sum of income before extraordinary items, R&D 
expenditures and depreciation. The firm is less likely to engage in earnings management 
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behavior if it has more internal funds.19 I include the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the 
Probit regression to control for endogeneity of the nature of the firm that goes public with debt, 
but not with its equity. 
Based on Barton and Simko (2002), I include net operating assets (NOA) as a measure of 
bloated balance sheets to control for the firm’s accruals management opportunities in my 
regression models because accruals management is an alternative approach to meeting earnings 
targets. Firms with higher NOAs are more constrained in their ability to manage earnings 
upwards. I measure NOA as net operating assets scaled by lagged sales.20  
For the regression equation that tests the degree of myopic R&D cuts by ownership type, 
I include variables that capture available funds and investment opportunity sets (Bushee 1998). 
Prior year changes in R&D expenditures measures the pattern or trend of the firm’s R&D 
expenditures. I compute changes in industry R&D intensity (CIRD) as changes in industry R&D 
spending to the total sales revenue.21 I include changes in sales (CSALE) as a proxy for changes 
in available funds for R&D expenditures. Distance (DIST) measures the percentage of R&D cuts 
in order to meet the earnings benchmarks.   
 
                                                 
19 INTFUND is highly correlated with other control variables (Table 3). For this reason, I do not include INTFUND 
in my regression models. 
20 Alternatively, I use discretionary accruals based on Modified Jones Model (Jones 1991) as described in Dechow 
et al. (1995). For each industry (2-digit SIC code) and each year, I estimate firm-specific normal accruals. Then, 
discretionary accruals are total accruals less normal accruals. The results of using discretionary accruals instead of a 
bloated balance sheet measure by Barton and Simko (2002) are qualitatively similar. 
21 Industry is classified by the 2-digit SIC code. 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Findings 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents the correlations among firm characteristics. Panel A of Table 3 shows the 
correlations of the variables used to test Roychowdhury’s (2006) real earnings management 
measures. Panel B of Table 3 presents correlations of the variables of the firms for the myopic 
R&D sample. Panel C shows correlations among variables that are used to predict private equity 
firms’ innate characteristics. An indicator variable, PRIVATE, is positively correlated with 
LEVERAGE, PPEGT_AT and LOSS, and negatively correlated with BME, SALES_GROWTH, 
OPERATYING_CYCLE, and CASH_AT. That is, consistent with the literature, issuance of 
public debt is positively related with leverage and the ratio of property, plant and equipment to 
the total assets, but is negatively associated with sales growth, operating cycle, and cash holdings 
to the total assets ratio. Panel D, Table 3 reports Pearson correlations for abnormal discretionary 
accruals and four metrics of real earnings management. There are positive associations between 
Abnormal RM measures and Abnormal AM. This indicates that managers who use accruals to 
manage earnings are also likely to manipulate real operations of the firm to reach earnings 
targets. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
Private equity firms with public debt and public equity firms exhibit different innate firm 
characteristics. Prior literature finds that the firms that go public with debt only are more 
leveraged, are more R&D intensive and have a higher ratio of property, plant and equipment to 
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total assets. The firms with both public debt and public equity are older, bigger, and more 
profitable compared to the private equity firms (Berkovitch et al. 2006; Givoly et al. 2010). 
Table 4 Panel A provides descriptive data about firm characteristics of two groups of the sample 
firms: private equity firms and public equity firms. I present a two-tailed t-test and a Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test for differences across two groups of the firms. For the full sample, it is evident that 
public equity firm-years are significantly more leveraged and less profitable than all public firm-
years. Private equity firms have shorter operating cycles, lower cash holdings, and higher ratios 
of PP&E to total assets than the public firms. Additionally, private equity firms are more 
constrained in terms of free cash flows and available funds for the firm’s operations. Panel B of 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of propensity matched-pairs sample. After I match each 
private equity firm to the observation that is in the same year and industry, that has similar firm 
size and leverage ratio (within ± 25%), and has the closest propensity score, the differences in 
firm characteristics between private equity and public equity firms decline. This suggests that the 
treatment firms are well matched.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Panel C of Table 4 provides descriptive data about three groups of my sample: private 
equity firms with public debt, public equity firms with private debt and public equity firms with 
public debt. Private equity firms with publicly traded debt firm-years are significantly smaller in 
size, more leveraged, and less profitable than firms with both public equity and public debt. 
Public equity firms with private debt have shorter operating cycles, lower cash holdings, and a 
higher ratio of PP&E to total assets than all public firms. Firms with public equity but with 
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private debt are the smallest, but have the most growth opportunities among three groups of the 
sample.  
To control for endogeneity of issuing private equity, I employ a propensity score matched 
pair research design. Figure 3 shows the distribution of both unmatched and propensity score 
matched firms. The post-matching distribution of the propensity score is similar between 
treatment and control sample as compared to pre-matching samples.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
 
4.2. Empirical analysis 
4.2.1 First-stage regression results 
 The first-stage probit regression results are provided in Table 5. Then, I use the estimates 
from the first-stage probit model to compute the inverse Mills’ ratio for each firm and include it 
as an additional control variable in my analysis. Consistent with Katz (2009), private firms are 
younger, more leveraged and have a shorter operating cycle. Private equity firms also show 
fewer growth opportunities and have lower cash to assets ratio. These findings are consistent 
with the univariate analysis presented in Panel C of Table 4. 
 




4.2.2 Myopic research and development (R&D) investment behavior 
I present the regression results for test of H1 in Table 6 and Table 7. Panel A of Table 6 
presents the results of the estimating equation (1) which examines the differential likelihood of 
cutting R&D to report small increases in earnings between two groups of firms, public equity 
and private equity (with public debt) firms. To analyze the relationship between myopic R&D 
cuts and firm’s ownership type, I require that the sample have nonzero R&D expenses for the 
current and lagged periods. The analysis includes 413 firm-year observations of private equity 
firms and 10,119 firm-year observations of public equity firms. Columns 1 & 2 and columns 3 & 
4 present regression results by separately estimating equation (1) for private equity and public 
equity firms. The regression model in the fifth column includes an indicator variable PRIVATE 
which equals one if the firm is a private equity firm but trades debt publicly, and zero otherwise. 
I also consider two indicator variables to test the differential effect of the firm’s ownership type 
on the likelihood of real activities management. The dummy variable SUSPECT1_PRIVATE is 
one if the firm is suspected of engaging in R&D curtailment and is a private firm, and zero 
otherwise. Similarly, the dummy variable SUSPECT1_PUBLIC is one if the firm is suspected of 
engaging in R&D curtailment and is a public firm, and zero otherwise.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
The coefficient on SUSPECT1 for a private equity sample is insignificant while the 
coefficient on SUSPECT1 for the public equity sample is significant at the 1% level. This means 
that the public equity firms are more likely to cut R&D expenditures to avoid zero or to improve 
current period earnings relative to the prior year. Regression in the third column confirms this 
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finding. Column five includes an inverse mills ratio to control for inherent attributes of the 
private equity with public debt firms.  I focus on the coefficient on SUSPECT1_PRIVATE (β2) 
and SUSPECT1_PRIVATE (β3) to examine whether public equity firms and public debt firms 
exhibit a differential likelihood of myopic R&D curtailment. The coefficient on 
SUSPECT1_PRIVATE (β2) is insignificant, indicating that private equity firms do not cut R&D 
expenditures to meet earnings benchmarks. By contrast, the coefficient on SUSPECT1_PUBLIC 
(β3) is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that public equity firms do cut R&D 
expenditures to meet earnings benchmarks. The coefficient on the size of the firm, SIZE, and the 
coefficient on LEVERAGE are not significant. The coefficient on capital expenditure (CCAPX), 
which proxies for limited funds available for R&D investments (CCAPX), is negative and 
significant. The change in sales (CSALES) is a proxy for firm growth. Higher growth firms are 
more likely to opportunistically cut R&D, as evidenced by Bushee (1998). Industry-adjusted 
R&D capacity is negatively associated with R&D curtailment, but it is insignificant in explaining 
R&D investment behavior. When the firm has more free cash flows (FCF), the firm is less likely 
to cut R&D expenditures. Finally, the coefficient on INV_MILLS is negative and statistically 
significant at 1%, consistent with endogeneity that the likelihood of real earnings management 
by the private equity firms differs from such behavior by the public equity firms.22 Marginal 
effects can be interpreted as follows. A change in independent variables by one standard 
deviation increases or decreases the probability of cutting R&D expenditures by standard 
deviation times the coefficient of the marginal effect.  
Panel B of Table 6 presents results for the differential likelihood of cutting R&D to report  
small increases in earnings between three groups of firms: private equity (with public debt) firms, 
                                                 
22 Inferences are unaffected if I include the interaction of the inverse Mills Ratio with the PRIVATE (an indicator 
variable equals to one if private equity firm and, zero otherwise) variable in the regression. 
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public equity firms without publicly traded debt and public equity firms with publicly traded debt. 
The coefficient on SUSPECT1_PRIVATE (β3) is insignificant while the coefficient on 
SUSPECT1_PUBLIC_EQUITY (β4) and the coefficient on SUSPECT1_BOTH_PUBLIC are (β5) 
both positive and significant at 1% levels. These regression results confirm findings in the two 
group analysis that the public equity firms are more likely to opportunistically cut R&D 
expenditures whether they have publicly traded debt or not.  
 
4.2.3 Real earnings management for the full sample 
Table 7 shows regression results of equation (7), which test hypothesis H1.  Results of 
real earnings management as a consequence of just meeting small positive income and beating 
last year’s earnings between two groups of firms that are private equity firms and public equity 
firms are presented in Panel A of Table 7. The first column is the regression result of the 
abnormal level of sales for two groups of firms. The coefficient on SUSPECT2_PRIVATE (ϒ2) 
is statistically insignificant, but the coefficient on SUSPECT2_PUBLIC (ϒ3) is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for Abnormal CFO. Overall, the regression outcome for 
abnormal cash flows suggests sales manipulation occurs more frequently for the firms with 
publicly traded equity. 
The second column is the regression result of the abnormal level of production between 
two groups of firms. Higher amounts of Abnormal PROD mean more opportunistic 
overproduction to lower the cost of sales. The coefficient SUSPECT2_PRIVATE (ϒ2) is 
insignificant. The coefficient SUSPECT2_PUBLIC (ϒ3) is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. That is, private equity firms engage in less overproduction to lower cost of sales per 
product to satisfy earnings benchmarks. The third column reports the results of firm’s ownership 
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type on the level of abnormal discretionary expense. Discretionary expense is the sum of R&D 
expenditures, SG&A expenses and advertising expenses. Coefficients on both interaction terms, 
SUSPECT2_PRIVATE (ϒ2) and SUSPECT2_PUBLIC (ϒ2), are negative and significant. This 
indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups of firms. In 
other words, it appears that public equity firms and private equity firms do not differ in 
managing discretionary expenses to meet earnings benchmarks. The regression outcomes of real 
earnings management behavior using an aggregate of three measures (Abnormal ALL) by two 
types of firms is in the fourth column. The coefficient on SUSPECT2_PRIVATE (ϒ2) is positive 
and insignificant, but the coefficient on SUSPECT2_PUBLIC (ϒ3) is negative and significant at 
the 1% level. This result confirms the finding that the firms that go public with debt, but not with 
their equity, attain their earnings goals significantly less through manipulation of real activities 
than those firms that become public with equity. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Panel B of Table 7 presents results for the three group classification. The coefficient on 
SUSPECT2_PRIVATE (ϒ3) is insignificant except for Abnormal DISEXP sample, but the 
coefficient on SUSPECT2_PUBLIC_EQUITY (ϒ4) and SUSPECT2_BOTH_PUBLIC (ϒ5) are 
significant in the direction of more abnormal real operating activities. However, abnormal levels 
of real earnings management are lower for firms with both public debt and equity than for public 
equity firms with private debt. This may be interpreted that the existence of both shareholders 




4.2.4 Real earnings management for the propensity score matched-pairs 
Table 8 presents results that compare real earnings management behavior between private 
equity and public equity firms based on propensity score matching methodology. Each private 
equity firm is matched to the observation with the closest propensity score in the public equity 
sample. The results in Panel A of Table 8 are qualitatively similar to the results found for the full 
sample. The coefficients of SUSPECT2_PRIVATE (ϒ2) are insignificant for Abnormal CFO, 
Abnormal PROD, and Abnormal ALL models, but the coefficients on SUSPECT2_PUBLIC (ϒ3) 
are significant at 1% level for Abnormal CFO, Abnormal PROD, and Abnormal ALL models. 
The coefficients of SUSPECT2_PRIVATE (ϒ2) and SUSPECT2_PUBLIC (ϒ3) for Abnormal 
DISEXP are significant for both private equity and public equity firms. This may indicate that 
managing discretionary expense is less costly and thus the most preferred choice by managers to 
meet earnings benchmarks both for private and for public equity firms. 
Using propensity score matched-pairs for the treatment and the control samples, I find 
that public equity firms are more likely to push sales and overproduce to inflate the current 
period earnings. Consistent with the full sample result, I find that both private equity firms and 
public equity firms manage discretionary expenses to meet their earnings benchmarks. The 
findings for propensity-matched pairs are statistically and qualitatively similar as the regression 
outcome using the full sample. Overall, I conclude that the public equity ownership puts earnings 
pressures on firms to which they respond by altering operations to meet their near-term earnings 
targets. 
 




Panel B of Table 8 presents results of the three group analysis. Except Abnormal DISEXP 
measure of real earnings management, I find that public equity firms are more likely to manage 
real activities to meet earnings benchmarks.  
 Given that managers can jointly use accruals management and real earnings management 
to reach their earnings goals, I test the robustness of my results to the simultaneous equations 
approach used by Zang (2011) and Yang et al. (2010). With equations (a) and (b) in Section 
3.2.4 I use two-stage least squares and determine predicted values of the endogenous variables. 
Then, I include them along with the exogenous variables, the inverse Mills ratio and an 
interaction term of PRIVATE dummy and inverse Mills ratio in the second stage regressions. 
Table 9 reports the result of the simultaneous equations models (a) and (b). Panel A of Table 9 
reports the results of the Hausman tests for the entire sample. The coefficients on Abnormal AM 
in the abnormal RM regression and the coefficients on Abnormal RM in the abnormal AM 
regressions are all significant. Further, all of Hausman (1978) tests reject the null hypothesis of 
the exogeneity of abnormal accruals and the exogeneity of abnormal real earnings management. 
This result suggests that discretionary accruals and abnormal real earnings management are 
partial substitutes and they are determined jointly. In addition, consistent with Givoly et al. (2010) 
Table 5 presents the significantly positive coefficient on SUSPECT2_PUBLIC for Abnormal 
AM (except the 6th column in Panel A, Table 9), indicating that public equity firms engage in 
more accruals management than do private equity firms. 
 




 Panel B, Table 9 reports the results of the Hasuman test for the BEAT firms. Similar to 
full sample result, firms in this category seem to use accruals management and real earnings 
management simultaneously. Panel C, Table 9 presents the results for JUST MEET firms. The 
Hausman tests show mixed findings for four real earnings management measures. It seems that 
the managers use whatever earnings management tool is available to meet their earnings 
objectives. For JUST MISS firms, Hausman tests fail to reject the exogeneity of abnormal 
accruals in Abnormal RM equation and also fail to reject the exogeneity of abnormal real 
activates in Abnormal AM decisions. The coefficients on Abnormal RM and the coefficients on 
Abnormal AM are insignificant except Abnormal CFO and Abnormal ALL sub-samples. For 
JUST MISS firms, there is weak evidence that firms choose to manage accruals before managing 
real operations. Panel E of Table 9 presents results for MISS firms. Hausman tests fail to reject 
the exogeneity of abnormal accruals in Abnormal RM equation, but reject the exogeneity of 
abnormal real operating activities in Abnormal AM equation. This indicates that accruals 
management and real earnings management decisions are made sequentially. Accruals 
management precedes real earnings management in this case. Overall, firms with good earnings 
performance use both accruals and real earnings management jointly, but badly performing firms 
seem to prefer accruals management. Firms that just meet earnings benchmarks show mixed 
findings. This may be indicative of managers’ reporting incentives to use whatever earnings 




4.2.5 Zero earnings benchmark versus zero earnings growth benchmark  
Table 10 reports whether private versus public equity firms differ in managing sales, 
production and other discretionary expenses to meet two different earnings benchmarks. I find 
that both private and public equity firms do not differ in manipulating operations to satisfy the 
zero earnings benchmark, but the private equity firms are significantly less likely to manipulate 
their operations to beat the zero earnings growth benchmark than are their public equity 
counterparts. This is evident from the OLS regression outcome presented in Table 10. The 
coefficients of both MEET_ZERO_PRIVATE (ϒ2) and MEET_ZERO_PUBLIC (ϒ3) are 
statistically insignificant. The coefficient of BEAT_LAST_PRIVATE (ϒ4) is insignificant while 
the coefficients on BEAT_LAST_PUBLIC (ϒ5) are significant at the 1% level for all four real 
earnings management models. Significant ϒ2 and ϒ3 for zero earnings benchmark group indicate 
that both private equity and public equity firms alter operations to deliver a positive income. A 
finding of ϒ5 < ϒ4 (ϒ5 > ϒ4 for Abnormal PROD) indicates that public equity firms engage in 
more real earnings management to show earnings growth than do private equity firms. I use an 
F-test to determine whether statistically significant differences between private equity and public 
equity firms exist to meet earnings growth benchmark as compared to zero earnings benchmark. 
Significant F-test for zero earnings growth benchmark sample shows a difference between 
private equity and public equity firms in their likelihood of using real earnings management to 
show earnings growth. The above findings suggest that both private equity and public equity 
firms alter operations to meet the zero earnings benchmark, but the public equity firms are more 





[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
Table 11 is the result of the regression (8) and the regression (9) for the matched-pairs 
based on the closest propensity score which is the estimated probability of a logit model. Overall, 
the regression outcome is qualitatively similar to the findings using the full sample. The first four 
columns provide empirical evidence for meeting zero earnings benchmark. Except Abnormal 
CFO, the coefficient of BEAT_ZERO_PRIVATE (ϒ2) is significant for Abnormal PROD, 
Abnormal DISEXP, and Abnormal ALL. For public equity firms, the coefficient is significant 
except for Abnormal DISEXP. Column 5 to column 8 provides the evidence of real earnings 
management for meeting zero earnings growth benchmark. Here, the evidence shows that only 
public equity firms manage operating activities to report improved earnings figure relative to the 
prior year. This reconfirms that both private and public equity firms manage real operating 
activities to meet the zero earnings benchmark, but the private firms are less likely to manage 
real operating activities to meet the zero earnings growth benchmark than do the public equity 
firms. 
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
4.2.6 High default risk firms versus low default risk firms 
Table 12 and Table 13 present empirical findings that test Hypothesis 2 using real 
earnings metrics suggested by Bushee (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006), respectively. When the 
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firm is financially distressed, earnings changes become more relevant to the bondholders because 
bondholders are fixed claimants. Thus, I expect that private equity with public debt firms have 
incentives to manipulate real operations of the firm to satisfy earnings benchmarks. Table 12 
shows that private equity firms, compared to public equity firms, are less likely to cut R&D 
expenditures to beat earnings targets regardless of the level of default risk. Both for high default 
risk firms and low default risk firms, public equity firms near earnings benchmarks are more 
likely to cut R&D expenditures.  
 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 
Table 13 presents evidence that both private equity and public equity firms manage their 
operating activities to meet earnings thresholds when they are financially weak. For the high 
default risk firm sample, coefficients of SUSPECT2_PRIVATE and SUSPECT2_PUBLIC are 
significant in the direction of more real earnings manipulation. Unlike for the high default firm 
sample, the coefficients of SUSPECT2_PRIVATE are not significant for three real earnings 
management measures, but the coefficients of SUSPECT2_PUBLIC are significant for all four 
measures of real earnings management. A finding of ϒ3 < ϒ2 (ϒ3 > ϒ2 for Abnormal PROD) for 
low default firms indicates that public equity firms engage in more real earnings management to 
meet earnings benchmarks than do private equity firms when they are financially strong. F-test 
shows a difference between private equity and public equity firms in their likelihood of using 
real earnings management for low default risk sample. When the firm is financially healthy, 
private equity firms seem less likely to manage real operations measured by real earnings metrics 
suggested by Roychowdhury (2006) compared to public equity firms.  
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Table 14 reports the results of the regression that test real earnings management behavior 
by high default versus low default firms using propensity score matching methodology. The 
regression outcome using propensity score matched-pairs shows that private firms manage real 
activities more actively than do the public equity firms when the firms’ default risk increases. 
For low default risk group, the public equity firms manage real activities more (Abnormal 
DISEXP and Abnormal ALL) than do private equity firms. Significant F-test for low default 
firms reconfirms findings in Table 13. However, the evidence is weak and mixed using the 
propensity score matched-pairs. 
 
[Insert Table 13 & 14 here] 
 
4.2.7 Time-series analysis 
Table 15 presents the result of this time-series analysis that examines the change in real 
earnings management behavior of firms prior to and subsequent to initial public equity offerings. 
In the first column, the coefficients of SUSPCT2_AFTER_ST and SUSPECT_AFTER_LT are 
negative and significant at the 1% and 10% level respectively. But, none of the coefficients of 
SUSPECT2_BEFORE_LT and SUSPECT2_BEFORE_ST are significant. This result may be 
interpreted that pressure from the capital markets leads managers to engage in more sales 
manipulations to meet earnings benchmarks after they publicly issue equity. The result in the 
second column suggests similar inference. The coefficient of SUSPCT2_AFTER_ST is positive 
and significant at the 10% level. For Abnormal PROD, higher coefficient value means more 
production to spread out the cost of goods sold to more units that ultimately inflate earnings. 
However, regression results in the third column do not support more earnings management after 
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issuing public equity. The fourth column, an aggregate metric of real earnings management, 
reports the opposite. Overall, it seems that the capital market puts earnings pressures on the firms, 
but the findings are mixed to draw a solid conclusion from this intertemporal analysis. 
 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
 
4.2.8 Subsequent operating performance of firms engaged in real operating activities 
management 
 Hypothesis 4 tests that public equity firms suffer more from engaging in real earnings 
management since they face short-term earnings pressure from the capital market and therefore 
are more likely to deviate from normal course of operation to meet earnings targets. On the other 
hand, I conjecture that private equity firms alter their operations for the strategic reasons other 
than for the purpose of meeting stakeholders’ earnings expectations. Table 16 and Table 17 
present the evidence that supports the hypothesis 4. The coefficient on RM_PUBLIC (ϒ3) is 
negative and significant for all four real earnings management measures while the coefficient on 
RM_PRIVATE (ϒ2) is insignificant. Significantly negative coefficients on RM_PUBLIC (ϒ3) 
can be interpreted as public equity firms that just meet earnings benchmarks through real 
earnings management suffering from lower industry-adjusted ROA in year t+1 than the firms 
that just meet the earnings targets without manipulating operating activities. The insignificant 
coefficient on RM_PRIVATE indicates that private equity firms that engage in real earnings 
management to just meet the earnings benchmarks do not perform worse than the firms that meet 
the earnings benchmarks but do not engage in real earnings management. In summary real 
earnings management by public equity firms results in negative future firm performance. This 
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may indicate that the public equity firms’ real earnings management is not the result of firms’ 
strategic operating decisions to perform better in the future, but rather the product of myopic 
managerial decisions to boost short-term earnings. 
 
[Insert Table 16 & 17 here] 
 
4.2.9 Supplemental analysis 
 To replicate Givoly et al. (2010) for the three group classification, I examine the 
influence of capital market pressure on managers reporting incentives to engage in income-
increasing accruals management. I use a modified Jones model (1991) to estimate 
nondiscretionary portion of total accruals for every industry and year, and subtract 
nondiscretionary accruals from total accruals to compute discretionary accruals. The amount of 
Discretionary accruals (Abnormal AM) is the dependent variable of equation (7). Consistent with 
Givoly et al. (2010), I find that private equity firms are less likely to manage discretionary 
accruals in an attempt to inflate the current period earnings compared to public equity firms. The 
evidence still holds even if I further classify public equity firms into two groups: public equity 
firms without publicly traded debt and public equity firms with publicly traded debt.  
 




 As argued earlier, firms can choose between accruals management and real earnings 
management. Firms’ choices depend on many factors including the costs and benefits of 
approaches, the need for earnings management and how far their pre-managed earnings are from 
the targets. In general, firms’ level of accruals management and the extent of real earnings 
management have a positive relationship (see Panel D, Table 3). Additionally, recall that I find 
that firms jointly manage accruals and real operating activities as presented in Table 9. Although 
firms are likely to use both methods of earnings management together, managers must decide the 
extent of each type of earnings management in relation to the other method to meet the earnings 
benchmarks. I divide the level of abnormal accruals into four quintiles and then group firms into 
two categories. Firms belong to the high accruals group if they are at the top quintile and the rest 
of the firms are classified as the low accruals group. Then, I run a regression equation (7) 
separately for high accruals group and the low accruals group (results not tabulated). I find that 
firms’ abnormal level of real earnings management in the high accruals group are statistically 
insignificant whether or not they are private equity or public equity firms. In contrast, I find that 
firms that belong to the low accruals group manage real operating activities. This may provide 
evidence that the firms jointly make accruals and real earnings management decisions, but they 
must decide on how much of which type of earnings management tool to be used in order to 
meet the earnings objectives 
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Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this study, I examine the effect of capital market pressure, as proxied by firm 
ownership structure, on the tendency to use real earnings management to meet earnings targets. 
Exposure to capital market pressure can be a monitoring factor that demands higher and more 
transparent earnings reports. However, capital market presence can burden top managers to make 
suboptimal operational decisions in order to avoid earnings disappointments, which may cause 
negative equity market reactions. The managers of firms with publicly traded equity bear higher 
costs of missing earnings thresholds since their compensation is at stake and they fear losing the 
confidence of equity investors who are sensitive to stock price movements. Using several 
measures of real earnings management, I find statistically significant empirical evidence that 
public equity firms have a higher propensity than private firms to manipulate their operations to 
meet earnings benchmark.  
Although private equity firms with public debt do not face the same capital market 
pressure that public equity firms face, they are not immune from incentives to engage in real 
earnings management. Specifically, I find that private equity firms with public debt engage in a 
greater degree of real earnings management as their debt moves closer to default. Given that debt 
claims become more like equity claims as a firm’s debt moves closer to default, this finding 
suggests that public debtholders exert similar pressure to public equity holders when their claims 
become more equity-like. Moreover, private equity firms with public debt that do engage in real 
earnings management appear to emphasize the zero earnings benchmark, consistent with prior 
research suggesting that this benchmark is of primary importance to creditors. 
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In addition, I assess the performance implications of capital market-induced real earnings 
management, by examining its association with one-year ahead industry-adjusted return on assets 
(ROA). I find that public equity firms that just meet earnings benchmarks while altering real 
operating activities suffer from lower future industry-adjusted ROA while private equity firms 
that just meet earnings benchmarks while altering real operating activities do not. The finding for 
the public equity firms validates concerns that operating decisions made in response to capital 
market pressure may negatively impact future firm performance. On the other hand, the results 
for private equity firms indicate that alterations of operating activities made in the absence of 
capital market pressure are more likely to be strategically sound. 
My study has some limitations. The sample size for the private equity firms (with public 
debt firms) is relatively small compared with the other groups of firms. Also, I cannot directly 
observe firms’ myopic behavior to manage operating activities to beat the earnings targets. The 
classification scheme I use for identifying earnings managers based on the proximity of reported 
earnings to relevant benchmarks is imperfect and may include those firms that have reasons to 
deviate from normal operations other than earnings management. The real earnings management 




Example of a firm’s ownership change from private equity to public equity 










Variable  Definition 
PRIVATE Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has public debt (private equity), 0 
otherwise 
SUSPECT1 Indicator variable equal to 1 if (pretax incomet+R&D expenditurest) < 
(pretax incomet-1+R&D expenditurest-1) and (pretax incomet+R&D 
expenditurest) > pretax incomet-1, 0 otherwise (See Bushee 1998 and Cheng 
2004) 
SUSPECT2 Indicator variable equal to 1 if (1) net income divided by total assets is 
greater than 0 but less than or equal to 0.005, or (2) the change in net income 
divided by total assets relative to the prior year is greater than 0 but less than 
or equal to 0.005, 0 otherwise (see Roychowdhury 2006). SUSPECT3 is 
similar except that I use 1%  at a cutoff point rather than 0.5%. SUSPECT2 
is equal to 1 if the observations are either BEAT_ZERO2 or BEAT_LAST2. 
BEAT_ZERO2 Indicator variable equal to 1 if net income divided by total assets is greater 
than 0 but less than or equal to 0.005, 0 otherwise 
BEAT_LAST2 Indicator variable equal to 1 if the change in net income divided by total 
assets relative to their prior year is greater than 0 but less than or equal to 
0.005, 0 otherwise 
CUT_RD Indicator variable equal to 1 if R&D expense is cut relative to the prior year, 
0 otherwise 
CFO Cash flows from operations divided by lagged total assets 
PROD Production costs, calculated as the sum of cost of goods sold and change in 
inventory divided by lagged total assets 
DISEXP Discretionary expense, calculated as the sum of selling, general and 
administration expenses,  
advertising expenses and R&D expense divided by lagged total assets 
Abnormal CFO Measured as deviations from the predicted values from the CFO model  
Abnormal PROD Measured as deviations from the predicted values from the PROD model  
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Abnormal DISEXP Measured as deviations from the predicted values from the DISEXP model  
NOA Net operating assets which is net operating assets computed as shareholders’ 
equity less cash and marketable securities, plus total debt scaled by sales  
CSALES Change in sales, calculated as logarithm of sales scaled by total assets less 
logarithm of lagged sales scaled by lagged total assets 
CCAPX Change in capital expenditures, calculated as logarithm of capital 
expenditures scaled by total assets less logarithm of lagged capital 
expenditures scaled by lagged total assets 
PCRD Prior year's R&D expense, calculated as logarithm of R&D expense scaled 
by total assets less logarithm of lagged R&D expense scaled by lagged total 
assets 
CIRD Change in R&D intensity, calculated as logarithm of R&D expense scaled 
by total sales less logarithm of lagged R&D expense scaled by lagged total 
sales 
CFUND Change in internal fund where internal fund is calculated as a sum of income 
before extraordinary items, R&D expenditures and depreciation, scaled by 
total sales 
CGDP Change in domestic gross product, calculated as logarithm of GDP at year 
less logarithm of GDP at year t-1 
FCF Cash from operations less average capital expenditure over the periods t-1 
and t-3, scaled by lagged current assets; cash from operations is calculated 
as income before extraordinary items less changes in current assets plus 
changes in current liabilities plus changes in cash less changes in short-term 
debt plus depreciation 
DIST Distance between income before extraordinary items plus R&D expense and  
income before extraordinary items plus R&D expense for the previous 
period, divided by lagged R&D expense 
BEFORE_LT Indicator variable equal to 1 for -3 and -4 years before issuing public equity 
and 0 otherwise 
BEFORE_ST Indicator variable equal to 1 for -2 and -1 years before issuing public equity 
and 0 otherwise 
AFTER_LT Indicator variable equal to 1 for +2 and +3 years before issuing public equity 
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and 0 otherwise 
AFTER_ST Indicator variable equal to 1 for the event year and for +1 year before issuing 
public equity and 0 otherwise 
SIZE Logarithm of total assets 
LEVERAGE Book value of total short- and long-term debt divided by total assets 
SALES_GROWTH Growth in sales from year t–1 to year t. 
BVE Book value of equity that is the sum of book value of equity, preferred stock 
and deferred taxes scaled by lagged total assets 
ROA Return on assets, calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by 
lagged total assets 
Adj.ROA Industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA), calculated as firm-specific ROA 
less median ROA for all firms in the same industry (2-digt SIC code) and 
year excluding the sample firm 
CROA Changes in ROA between years t-1 and t+1 
NOL Indicator variable equal to one if a firm has net operating loss carryforwards 
available at the beginning of year t, and zero otherwise 
OPERATING_CYCLE Days for receivable collection period plus inventory turnover, calculated as 
average accounts receivables divided total revenues divided 360 days plus 
average inventory divided COGS divided by 360 days. 
LOSS Indicator variable, equal to 1 if income before extraordinary items is less 
than 0 and, zero otherwise 
RNOA A profitability measure that is computed as operating income divided by net 
operating assets, where operating income is net income + translation 
adjustment + after-tax interest expense-after-tax interest income + minority 
interest income. Net operating assets are common equity+ current debt+ 
long-term debt+ preferred stock- cash-investment and advances + minority 
interest (see Givoly et al. 2010) 
FIRM_AGE Number of years the firm is listed on Compustat Database 
BIG5 An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 5 accounting 
firm, 0 otherwise 
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QUICK Cash and cash equivalents plus total receivables divided by current liabilities 
CASH_ASSETS Ratio of cash and cash equivalents to lagged total assets. 
CAPX_ASSETS Ratio of capital expenditures to total assets 
DEFAULT Indicator variable, equal to 1if S&P debt rating is an speculative grade 
(BBB- or below), 0 otherwise. The ratings range from AAA to D. These 
ratings reflect S&P's assessment of the creditworthiness of the debtor with 
respect to debt obligations. Debt ratings that are BB- or below are 
considered to be speculative. 
INV_MILLS Inverse Mills Ratio from Heckman (1979) two-stage sample selection 
correction procedure Following the Heckman (1979) procedure, in the first 
stage I estimate a PROBIT model with, as predictors, size (alternatively 
defined as the natural logarithms of total assets or sales), ratio of book value 
of equity to total assets, growth (in sales), leverage, profitability (operating 
income divided by net operating assets), net operating loss carryforwards, 
quick ratio, length of the operating cycle, firm age, capital expenditures 
(both divided by total assets), a dummy for loss firms, and audit quality (a 
dummy for the big national accounting firms). Estimates of the PROBIT 
model are used to compute an Inverse Mills’ Ratio for each firm. In the 
second stage, the Inverse Mills’ Ratio is added to equation (5) as a control 
variable. (See Katz 2009; Givoly et al. 2010) 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of the squared share of 
each company in total sales of the industry 
Z_SCORE Firm’s Altman Z-score calculated as Z = 1.2 X1 + 1.4 X2 + 3.3 X3 + 0.6 X4 
+ 1.0 X5 where X1 = working capital/total assets, X2 = retained 
earnings/total assets, X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets, X4 
= market value equity/book value of total liabilities, and X5 = sales/total 
assets 
SOX Dummy variable equals 1 if the fiscal year is 2002 and later, 0 otherwise 
LITIGATION Dummy variable equals 1 if the firm belongs to one of the following 
industries: biotechnology (SIC 2833-2836), computer (SIC 3570-3577, 
7370-7374), electronics (SIC 3600-3674), and retailing industry (SIC 5200-
5961) 
RDindustry Dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is classified as R&D intensive 
industry and 0 otherwise: chemicals and pharmaceutics (2-digit SIC code 
28), machinery and computer hardware (2-digit SIC code 35), electrical and 
electronics (2-digit SIC code 36), transportation vehicles (2-digit SIC code 
37), scientific instruments (2-digit SIC code 38). high R&D (biotechnology 
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is SIC 2830 - 2839, computer is SIC 3570 - 3579, high technology is SIC 
3600 - 3699, and software is SIC 7370 - 7379) 
OVERPRODUCE Property, plant and equipment ratio to total assets 
 
  
Firm-year observations (5,414 firm
public equity firms) are divided into earnings interval over 
extraordinary items divided by total assets. Each interval has a wid
16 included the value between 0 and 0.005.
 (a) Earnings Distribution near Zero Earnings for All Sample Firms





-years for private equity firms and 42,839 firm
-0.75 to +0.75 using income before 




Private Equity Firms 
-years for 
 




FIGURE 1 (Con’t) 
Public Equity Firms 
 
Firm-year observations (5,414 firm
public equity firms) are divided into earnings interval over 
income before extraordinary items 
Each interval has a width of 0.005. Earnings interval 16 included the 
and 0.005. 
 (a) Earnings Growth Distribution for All Sample Fir




-years for private equity firms and 42,839 firm
-0.75 to +0.75 using changes in 






































































































Sample Selection  
Sample Selection Procedure 
  No. of Firm-
Year Obs. 
  No. of 
Firms 
Total  Compustat Observations from 1987-2009  254,426   26,200 
       Less: Financial Institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999)   (60,001)   (6,748) 
       Less: Regulated Industries (SIC codes 4800-4900)   (8,829)      (941) 
       Less: Missing variables & total debt  < 50 million   (137,793)  (19,452) 







TABLE 2  
Panel A: Number of Observations of Sample Firms by Ownership Type 
  
 
Private Equity Firms 
 





No. of Obs. 
 
% of Sample   No. of Obs. 
 
% of Sample 
 
No. of Obs. 
1987 164 10.6%           1,376  89.4% 1,540 
1988 192 11.9%         1,417  88.1% 1,609 
1989 229 13.9%         1,418  86.1% 1,647 
1990 245 14.4%         1,455  85.6% 1,700 
1991 232 14.0%         1,420  86.0% 1,652 
1992 206 12.0%         1,515  88.0% 1,721 
1993 207 11.6%         1,572  88.4% 1,779 
1994 206 11.0%         1,673  89.0% 1,879 
1995 200 9.9%         1,828  90.1% 2,028 
1996 204 9.4%         1,968  90.6% 2,172 
1997 201 8.6%         2,140  91.4% 2,341 
1998 227 9.2%         2,247  90.8% 2,474 
1999 222 8.9%         2,261  91.1% 2,483 
2000 269 11.0%         2,182  89.0% 2,451 
2001 304 12.8%         2,066  87.2% 2,370 
2002 330 14.2%         1,993  85.8% 2,323 
2003 338 14.9%         1,933  85.1% 2,271 
2004 299 13.1%         1,989  86.9% 2,288 
2005 270 11.9%         2,001  88.1% 2,271 
2006 240 10.5%         2,051  89.5% 2,291 
2007 210 9.1%         2,086  90.9% 2,296 
2008 220 9.6%         2,072  90.4% 2,292 
2009 199 10.3%           1,726  89.7% 1,925 





TABLE 2 (Con’t) 

















No. of Obs. 413  5,050                   5,213                      2,444                 5,209         5,414  
  
No. of Firm 121                     838                     859                        633                   857            882  
Public Firms 
 
No. of Obs. 10,119  37,498  40,037                   34,004               40,013        42,389  
No. of Firm 1,545  5354 5559                     5,040                 5,556         5,805  
Total No. of Obs. 10,532  42,548                 45,250                    36,448               45,222        47,803  
No. of Firm 1,628  5,897                   6,101                      5,427                 6,098         6,357  
Total number of firms may not equal to the sum of private firms and public firms since the firms in my sample can change their status over the 
sample period of 1987-2009. 
 
Panel C: Industry Distributions of Sample Firms by Ownership Type 
  
Private Equity Firms 
 




(2-digit SIC codes) 
No. of Obs. 
 
% of Sample   No. of Obs. 
 
% of Sample 
 
No. of Obs. 
Mining and Construction (10-14, 15-17) 77 1.7% 4,350 98.3% 4,427 
Manufacturing I (20-29) 704 7.0% 9,356 93.0% 10,060 
Manufacturing II (30-39) 702 6.1% 10,863 93.9% 11,565 
Transportation (40-49) 3,013 31.4% 6,589 68.6% 9,602 
Retail & Wholesale Trade (50-59) 526 8.8% 5,433 91.2% 5,959 
Services (70-89) 382 6.5% 5,454 93.5% 5,836 
Other 10 2.8% 344 97.2% 354 




TALBE 2 (Con’t) 
Panel D: Debt Rating Categories of Private Equity and Public Equity Firms 
  
 
Private Equity Firms   
Public Equity Firms  
w/ Public Debt 
  Total  
S&P Rating Rating Points No. of Obs. 
 
% of Sample 
 
No. of Obs. 
 
% of Sample No. of Obs. 
AAA 21 73 19.3% 306 80.7% 379 
AA+ 20 32 20.6% 123 79.4% 155 
AA 19 136 19.8% 552 80.2% 688 
AA- 18 209 25.3% 616 74.7% 825 
A+ 17 341 24.7% 1,041 75.3% 1,382 
A 16 406 18.7% 1,765 81.3% 2,171 
A- 15 391 20.2% 1,549 79.8% 1,940 
BBB+ 14 502 21.3% 1,856 78.7% 2,358 
BBB 13 529 18.9% 2,273 81.1% 2,802 
BBB-   12   284   14.6%   1,662   85.4%   1,946 
BB+ 11 128 10.0% 1,155 90.0% 1,283 
BB 10 194 10.4% 1,674 89.6% 1,868 
BB- 9 307 12.6% 2,133 87.4% 2,440 
B+ 8 896 29.3% 2,164 70.7% 3,060 
B 7 532 34.9% 992 65.1% 1,524 
B- 6 177 26.9% 481 73.1% 658 
CCC+ 5 89 35.0% 165 65.0% 254 
CCC 4 43 34.4% 82 65.6% 125 
CCC- 3 15 27.3% 40 72.7% 55 
CC/C 2 19 33.9% 37 66.1% 56 
D/SD 1 30 22.4% 104 77.6% 134 
Not Rated     81 9.1% 812 90.9% 893 





Panel A: Pearson Correlations for the Real Earnings Management Measure Sample 
 
SIZE LEVERAGE ROA NOA INTFUND SALES_GROWTH 
LEVERAGE -0.3512***   
    
ROA  0.2223*** -0.3831***   
   
NOA -0.0051  0.1037*** -0.0949*** 
   
INTFUND  0.5826*** -0.1724***  0.1712*** -0.0509***     
SALES_GROWTH -0.0219*** -0.0698***  0.1829***  0.2899***  0.0115** 
 
LOSS -0.2303***  0.3424*** -0.6546***  0.0403*** -0.1521***  -0.1904*** 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Panel B: Pearson Correlations for R&D Curtailment Sample 
 
SIZE LEVERAGE CSALES CCAPX PCRD CIRD CGDP FCF 
LEVERAGE -0.3512*** 
       
CSALES  0.0458***  0.0642*** 
      
CCAPX  0.0205*** -0.0341***  0.1845*** 
     
PCRD  0.0033  0.0041 -0.0772*** -0.0896*** 
    
CIRD -0.0412***  0.0379***  0.0224***  -0.0027  0.0196** 
   
CGDP -0.1013***  0.0163***  0.0474***   0.0990*** -0.0458*** -0.0704*** 
  
FCF   0.2261*** -0.3046*** -0.0242***   0.1615***  0.0120 -0.0303*** -0.0129*** 
 
DIST   0.0126 -0.0216***  0.0023 -0.0040  0.0499*** -0.0175** -0.0109 0.0675*** 






Table 3 (Con'd) 
Panel C: Pearson Correlations between Private Firm-Year Indicator Variable and Firm Characteristics 
 
PRIVATE SIZE LEVERAGE 
SALES_ 
GROWTH 
NOL LOSS FIRM_AGE BIG5 
OPERATING_ 
CYCLE 
QUICK RNOA CASH_AT 
SIZE  0.0453*** 
           
LEVERAGE  0.1807*** -0.3512*** 
          
SALES_GROWTH -0.0599*** -0.0219*** -0.0698*** 
         
NOL -0.1944*** -0.0865*** -0.0517***  0.0350*** 
        
LOSS  0.0038 -0.2303***  0.3424*** -0.1904*** -0.0054 
       
FIRM_AGE  0.0049  0.3648*** -0.2161*** -0.0988*** -0.1132*** -0.1937*** 
      
BIG5  0.0163***  0.1235*** -0.0492*** -0.0055 -0.0055 -0.0204***  0.0071 
     
OPERATING_CYCLE -0.1025*** -0.0243*** -0.0318*** -0.1593***  0.0677***  0.0573*** -0.0048 -0.0375*** 
    
QUICK -0.0578***  0.0194*** -0.0100**  0.0682*** -0.0202***  0.0167*** -0.1610***  0.0213*** -0.1479*** 
   
RNOA  0.0316***  0.1208*** -0.1495***  0.0990***  0.0207*** -0.3361***  0.0884***  0.0019 -0.0331*** -0.0355*** 
  
CASH_AT -0.1387*** -0.0469*** -0.0663***  0.1158***  0.0586***  0.0667*** -0.1530***  0.0088*  0.0755***  0.3655*** -0.0442*** 
 
PPEGT_AT  0.0979***  0.0904*** -0.0178***  0.1356*** -0.1228*** -0.1095***  0.0812*** -0.0155*** -0.3175***  0.1187***  0.0513*** -0.1546*** 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Panel D: Pearson Correlations among Abnormal Accruals and Real Earnings Management Metrics 
 
Abnormal AM Abnormal CFO Abnormal PROD Abnormal DISEXP 
Abnormal CFO -0.2554* 
   
Abnormal PROD  0.0231* -0.3685* 
  
Abnormal DISEXP -0.1115* -0.0663* -0.6633* 
 
Abnormal ALL -0.1379*  0.4296* -0.9167* 0.8242* 






Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of the Firms by Two Ownership Type (Two Groups): Full Sample 
Variable 
 
Private Equity  
Firms  
Public Equity  
Firms  
Difference in 
Mean / Median  
SIZE Mean 7.344 7.125 0.219*** 
Median 7.300 6.924 0.377*** 
LEVERAGE Mean 50.1% 37.1% 0.131*** 
Median 39.4% 33.7% 0.057*** 
NOA Mean 0.203 0.201 0.003 
Median -0.024 0.002 -0.027*** 
SALES_GROWTH Mean 2.2% 6.9% -0.047*** 
Median 3.5% 7.5% -0.040*** 
ROA Mean 1.6% 2.4% -0.008*** 
Median 2.9% 3.8% -0.009*** 
QUICK Mean 58.5% 62.2% -0.037*** 
Median 58.7% 62.3% -0.036*** 
BVE Mean 28.7% 45.4% -0.167*** 
Median 39.6% 45.7% -0.062*** 
CSALES Mean 0.000 -0.002 0.002 
Median 0.056 0.005 0.052** 
CCAPX Mean -0.007 -0.051 0.044*** 
Median 0.008 -0.025 0.033*** 
PCRD Mean -0.032 -0.022 -0.010 
Median 0.013 -0.002 0.016 
CIRD Mean 0.020 0.015 0.005*** 
Median 0.025 0.025 0.000*** 
CFUND Mean -0.006 -0.004 -0.002*** 
Median 0.000 -0.006 0.006*** 
FCF Mean 0.018 0.022 -0.004*** 
Median 0.022 0.028 -0.006*** 
DIST Mean -2.549 0.508 -3.057* 
Median 0.172 0.299 -0.127 
OPERATING_CYCLE Mean 94 123 -28.9*** 
Median 81 102 -21.7*** 
CASH_AT Mean 3.1% 9.5% -0.064 
Median 1.0% 4.1% -0.031*** 
CAPX_AT Mean 6.1% 8.8% -0.027*** 
Median 5.1% 5.6% -0.005*** 
PPEGT_AT Mean 92.3% 77.0% 0.154*** 
Median 100.3% 69.9% 0.303*** 
No. of Obs. 5,414 42,389 
No. of Firms 882 5,805 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. I present two-tailed t-test for mean 





TABLE 4 (Con’t) 






Public Equity  
Firms  
Difference in 
Mean / Median 
SIZE Mean 7.401 7.393 0.008   
Median 7.371 7.265 0.107 
LEVERAGE Mean 45.7% 46.6% -0.009** 
Median 38.2% 40.8% -0.026*** 
NOA Mean 0.165 0.183 -0.018*** 
Median -0.020 0.004 -0.025* 
SALES_GROWTH Mean 2.2% 4.3% -0.021*** 
Median 3.4% 5.3% -0.018*** 
ROA Mean 2.1% 1.4% 0.007*** 
Median 3.1% 3.3% -0.002** 
QUICK Mean 58.5% 62.9% -0.044*** 
Median 58.6% 63.3% -0.048*** 
BVE Mean 33.6% 35.2% -0.016** 
Median 42.1% 40.4% 0.016 
CSALES Mean -0.004 0.005 -0.009* 
Median 0.008 0.008 -0.000 
CCAPX Mean -0.009 -0.033 0.024** 
Median 0.008 -0.016 0.024*** 
PCRD Mean -0.035 -0.029 -0.006 
Median 0.009 0.009 0.001 
CIRD Mean 0.020 0.020 -0.001* 
Median 0.025 0.025 0 
CFUND Mean -0.004 -0.030 0.026** 
Median 0.000 -0.008 0.008 
FCF Mean 0.019 0.011 0.009*** 
Median 0.023 0.017 0.006*** 
DIST Mean -2.567 3.768 -6.335** 
Median 0.150 0.131 0.019 
OPERATING_CYCLE Mean 92 92 0.079 
Median 80 78 1.606* 
CASH_AT Mean 2.9% 5.2% -0.023*** 
Median 0.8% 1.9% -0.011*** 
CAPX_AT Mean 6.1% 7.3% -0.012*** 
Median 5.2% 5.9% -0.007*** 
PPEGT_AT Mean 94.6% 93.8% 0.008 
Median 104.0% 99.8% 0.042** 
No. of Obs. 4,484 4,484 
No. of Firms 777 1,363 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  I present two-tailed t-test for mean 





TABLE 4 (Con’t) 




Private Equity  
Firms with  




 Firms with  
Private Debt  
(2) 
 
Public Equity  
Firms with  














Mean 7.344  
 





























































































































































































































































































































































































    
No. of Firms      882    4,520    2,743         
*, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  I present two-tailed t-test for mean differences and Wilcoxon 





First-stage Regression of a Firm's Choice to Have Privately Held Equity 
PRIVATEi,t = α0+α1SIZEi,t + α2LEVERAGEi,t + α3SALES_GROWTHi,t + α4NOLi,t + α5LOSSi,t 
                      + α6FIRM_AGEi,t + α7BIG5i,t + α8OPERATING_CYCLEi,t + α9QUICKi,t  
                      + α10RNOAi,t + α11CASH_ATi,t + α12PPEGT_ATi,t + εi,t 
Variable 
 
Dependent variable = PRIVATE 









































































*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix B. 
In this probit regression, I account for the possible endogeneity in the firm's decision to have privately 
held equity by using the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure, following the similar approach used by 




Panel A: Logistic Regression of the Probability of Cutting R&D Expenditures Private Equity and Public Equity Firms (Two Groups) 
Prob (CUT_RDi,t =1) = β0 + β1PRIVATEi,t + β2SUSPECT1_PRIVATEi,t + β3SUSPECT1_PUBLICi,t  + β4SIZEi,t 
                                                     + β5LEVERAGEi,t  +  β6CSALESi,t + β7CCAPXi,t  + β8PCRDi,t + β9CIRDi,t + β10CGDPi,t 
                                   + β11CFUNDi,t + β12FCFi,t + β13DISTi,t + β14INV_MILLSi,t + εi,t 
  Private Equity Firms 
 
Public Equity Firms 
 











Intercept β0 -1.068   -1.079***   0.258  
  (-1.42)   (-7.49)   (1.25)  
SUSPECT1  -0.062 -0.014  0.379***  0.077    
  (-0.28)   (6.67)     
PRIVATE β1       0.402***  0.082 
        (2.84)  
SUSPECT1_PRIVATE β2       -0.143 -0.029 
        (-0.64)  
SUSPECT1_PUBLIC β3       0.421***  0.085 
        (7.25)  
SIZE β4 0.131*  0.031  0.068***  0.014  0.021  0.004 
  (1.92)   (4.42)   (1.27)  
LEVERAGE β5 0.092  0.022  0.437**  0.089  -0.162 -0.033 
  (0.21)   (2.82)   (-0.98)  
CSALES β6 0.215  0.050  0.412***  0.084  0.305**  0.062 
  (0.37)   (3.49)   (2.49)  
CCAPX β7 -0.728*** -0.170  -0.535*** -0.109  -0.609*** -0.124 
  (-3.39)   (-9.51)   (-10.48)  
PCRD β8 0.518  0.121  0.632*** 0.129  0.616***  0.125 
  (1.30)   (8.58)   (7.93)  
CIRD β9 -0.809 -0.189  -0.21 -0.043  -0.253 -0.051 
  (-1.16)   (-0.94)   (-1.18)  
CGDP β10 0.00  0.000  -0.001***  0.000  -0.001***  0.000 
  (-0.80)   (-7.61)   (-7.27)  
CFUND β11 -0.091 -0.021  0.049  0.010  0.04  0.008 
  (-0.62)   (1.16)   (0.95)  
FCF β12 -2.353 -0.550  -2.745*** -0.559  -2.667*** -0.541 
  (-1.20)   (-8.75)   (-8.59)  
DIST β13 0.003  0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.00  0.000 
  (1.03)   (-0.26)   (-0.10)  
INV_MILLS β14       -0.359*** -0.073 
        (-9.19)  
          
LOG LIKELIHOOD  -277.466   -6176.553   -6238.633  
CHI-SQUARE  25.472   398.702   502.866  
N  413    10,119    10,532   
SUSPECT1_PRIVATE is one if firm-year observation is suspicious of R&D curtailment (SUSPECT1) and is a private equity firm 
and zero, otherwise. SUSPECT1_PUBLIC is one if firm-year observation is suspicious of R&D curtailment (SUSPECT1) and is a 
public equity firm and zero, otherwise.*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The p-values are computed 
using robust standard errors for firm clusters.SUSPECT1_PRIVATE is one if firm-year observation is suspicious of R&D 
curtailment (SUSPECT1) and is a private equity firm and zero, otherwise. SUSPECT1_PUBLIC is one if firm-year observation is 




TABLE 6 (Con’t) 
Panel B: Logistic Regression of the Probability of Cutting R&D Expenditures Private Equity and Public Equity Firms (Three Groups) 
Prob(CUT_RDi,t =1) = β0 + β1PRIVATEi,t + β2PUBLIC_EQUITYi,t + β3SUSPECT_PRIVATEi,t+ β4SUSPECT1_PUBLIC_EQUITYi,t 
                                   + β5SUSPECT1_BOTHC_PUBLICi,t + β6SIZEi,t+ β7LEVERAGEi,t + β8CSALESi,t + β9CCAPXi,t + β10PCRDi,t 
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(3.59)  
 




         
(6.60)  
 






















































































































































INV_MILLS β16          
-0.358*** -0.073 
           
(-9.18) 
 
             































*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. SUSPECT1_PRIVATE is one if firm-year observation is suspicious 
of R&D curtailment (SUSPECT1) and is a private equity firm and zero, otherwise. SUSPECT1_PUBLIC_EQUITY is one if firm-year 
observation is suspicious of R&D curtailment (SUSPECT1) and is a public equity firm with no publicly traded debt and zero, 
otherwise. SUSPECT1_BOTH_PUBLIC is one if firm-year observation is suspicious of R&D curtailment (SUSPECT1) and is a firm 





Panel A: Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures by Ownership 
Types  (Two Groups): Full Sample 
Abnormal RM = ϒ0+ϒ1PRIVATEi,t + ϒ2SUSPECT2_PRIVATEi,t + ϒ3SUSPECT2_PUBLICi,t + ϒ4SIZEi,t 
                           + ϒ5LEVERAGEi,t +ϒ6ROAi,t +ϒ7SALES_GROWTHi,t + ϒ8NOAi,t + ϒ9LOSSi,t 










Intercept ϒ0 -0.003 0.148*** -0.183*** -0.301*** 
(-0.48) (9.01) (-9.35) (-9.22) 
PRIVATE ϒ1 -0.003* -0.005 -0.003 0.014 
(-1.66) (-1.00) (-0.35) (1.51) 
SUSPECT2_PRIVATE ϒ2 0.003 -0.002 -0.025** 0.003 
(1.30) (-0.47) (-2.36) (0.34) 
SUSPECT2_PUBLIC ϒ3 -0.007*** 0.013*** -0.014*** -0.026*** 
(-6.50) (4.55) (-4.06) (-5.07) 
SIZE ϒ4 -0.003*** -0.003** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
(-5.93) (-2.18) (6.33) (3.66) 
LEVERAGE ϒ5 0.010* -0.106*** 0.030* 0.122*** 
(1.94) (-8.85) (1.93) (5.13) 
ROA ϒ6 0.325*** -0.506*** -0.068** 0.725*** 
(19.69) (-20.38) (-2.24) (15.17) 
SALEGS_GROWTH ϒ7 -0.018*** -0.032*** 0.096*** 0.091*** 
(-6.26) (-6.35) (16.54) (10.04) 
NOA ϒ8 0.001 -0.001 -0.007*** -0.003 
(0.95) (-1.21) (-6.03) (-1.33) 
LOSS ϒ9 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 
(-1.43) (-1.09) (-0.80) (-1.00) 














         
Statistical Test: 
        






















 45,250  
 
 36,448  
 
45,222  
*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard errors 
for firm clusters. SUSPECT_PRIVATE is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging real earnings management 
(SUSPECT2) and a private equity firm and zero, otherwise. SUSPECT_PUBLIC is one if the firm is suspicious in 
engaging real earnings management (SUSPECT2) and a public equity firm with or without publicly traded debt and 





TABLE 7 (Con’t) 
Panel B: Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures by Ownership Types  
(Three Groups): Full Sample 
Abnormal RM = ϒ0+ϒ1PRIVATEi,t + ϒ2PUBLIC_EQUITYi,t+ ϒ3SUSPECT2_PRIVATEi,t  +ϒ4SUSPECT2_PUBLIC_EQUITYi,t  
                           + ϒ5SUSPECT2_BOTH_PUBLICi,t  + ϒ6SIZEit + ϒ7LEVERAGEi,t + ϒ8ROAi,t + ϒ9SALES_GROWTHi,t   
































































































































































































         
Statistical Test: 
        











































*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard errors for firm 
clusters. In this regression, I classify firms into three groups: private equity firms with public debt, private equity firms without public 
debt and firms with both public equity and debt. SUSPECT2_PRIVATE is 1 if the firm is a suspicious of engaging in earnings 
management and has private equity with public debt, and 0 otherwise. SUSPECT2_PUBLIC_EQUITY is 1 if the firm is suspicious of 
engaging in earnings management and has public equity, but don't have public debt and 0 otherwise. SUSPECT2_BOTH_PUBLIC is 
1 if the firm is suspicious of engaging in earnings management and has both public equity and public debt, and 0 otherwise. All other 





Panel A: Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures by Ownership 
Types (Two Groups): Propensity Score Matched-Pairs 
Abnormal RM = ϒ0+ϒ1PRIVATEi,t + ϒ2SUSPECT2_PRIVATEi,t + ϒ3SUSPECT2_PUBLICi,t  
                           + ϒ4SIZEi,t + ϒ5LEVERAGEi,t + ϒ6ROAi,t + ϒ7SALES_GROWTHi,t + ϒ8NOAi,t   










Intercept ϒ0 0.016*** 0.052*** -0.009 -0.035 
(2.59) (3.58) (-0.33) (-1.25) 
PRIVATE ϒ1 -0.005*** 0.012** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
(-2.77) (2.37) (-2.69) -(2.69) 
SUSPECT2_PRIVATE ϒ2 0.002 0.000 -0.027*** -0.005 
(1.05) (-0.07) (-2.61) -(0.66) 
SUSPECT2_PUBLIC ϒ3 -0.007*** 0.012*** -0.018* -0.026*** 
(-3.89) (3.23) (-1.86) -(3.65) 
SIZE ϒ4 -0.003*** 0.000 0.003 0.00 
(-4.77) (-0.27) (0.96) (-0.10) 
LEVERAGE ϒ5 -0.004 -0.075*** -0.029 0.026 
(-0.58) (-4.28) (-1.25) (0.75) 
ROA ϒ6 0.297*** -0.460*** -0.072 0.686*** 
(9.54) (-9.73) (-1.19) (7.14) 
SALEGS_GROWTH ϒ7 -0.006 -0.024*** 0.108*** 0.067*** 
(-1.34) (-3.55) (7.85) (4.99) 
NOA ϒ8 0.001* -0.005** -0.002 0.006** 
(1.68) (-2.47) (-1.02) (2.11) 
LOSS ϒ9 -0.011*** 0.009 -0.011 -0.033*** 
(-3.09) (1.51) (-1.32) (-2.79) 
 
Statistical Test: 
    F-test: ϒ2 = ϒ3 12.26*** 5.04** 0.43 0.05* 
Adj. R2 18.10% 9.20% 3.40% 8.40% 
N 8,626  8,968  4,107  8,966  
*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard 
errors for firm clusters. I examine the influence of public equity ownership for two groups of firms: public equity firms 
and private equity firms. Here, I match each of the private equity firm-years with a firm-year in the public equity firm 
samples that are (1) in the same year, (2) in the same industry (2-digit SIC code), (3) have firm size and leverage 
within ± 25%, and (4) have the smallest propensity score difference. These procedures result in 4,484 pairs of the 
matched-firm years. The number of matched pairs used for each of four real earnings management measure varies. 
SUSPECT_PRIVATE is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging real earnings management (SUSPECT2) and a 
private equity firm and zero, otherwise. SUSPECT_PUBLIC is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging real earnings 
management (SUSPECT2) and a public equity firm with or without publicly traded debt and zero, otherwise. All other 




TABLE 8 (Con’t) 
Panel B: Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures by Ownership Types 
(Three Groups): Propensity Score Matched-Pairs 
Abnormal RM = ϒ0+ϒ1PRIVATEi,t + ϒ2PUBLICi,t + ϒ3SUSPECT2_PRIVATEi,t       
                                          + ϒ4SUSPECT2_PUBLIC_EQUITYi,t + ϒ5SUSPECT2_PUBLIC_BOTHi,t + ϒ6SIZEi,t 



















































































































































































         
Statistical Test: 
        











































*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard errors for 
firm clusters. In this regression, I classify firms into three groups: private equity firms with public debt, private equity firms 
without public debt and firms with both public equity and debt. SUSPECT2_PRIVATE is 1 if the firm is a suspicious of 
engaging in earnings management and has private equity with public debt, and 0 otherwise. SUSPECT2_PUBLIC_EQUITY 
is 1 if the firm is suspicious of engaging in earnings management and has public equity, but don't have public debt, and 0 
otherwise. SUSPECT2_BOTH_PUBLIC is 1 if the firm is suspicious of engaging in earnings management and has both 
public equity and public debt, and 0 otherwise. Here, I match each of the private equity firm-years with a firm-year in the 
public equity firm samples that are (1) in the same year, (2) in the same industry (2-digit SIC code), (3) have firm size and 
leverage within ± 25%, and (4) have the smallest propensity score difference. These procedures result in 4,484 pairs of the 
matched-firm years. The number of matched pairs used for each of four real earnings management measure varies. All other 




Panel A: Hausman Test for Simultaneity versus Sequentiality of Abnormal Accruals and Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures: Full Sample 
The Hausman test is conducted by regressing Abnormal AM on the exogenous variables and the predicted value from the fist-stage regression and the actual Abnormal RM 
(Abnormal CFO, Abnormal PROD, Abnormal DISEXP, and Abnormal ALL). Exogenous variables are cost factors of engaging in accruals management and other firm-
specific control variables.  
 
Abnormal RM = ϕ0 + ϕ1AbnormalAM+ ϕ2PRIVATE + ϕ3SUSPECT_PRIVATE + ϕ4SUSPECT_PUBLIC + ϕ5∑Control Variable of RM +  ϕ6∑Other Controls  
                          + ϕ7INV_MILLS  + ϕ8PRIVATE*INV_MILLS + υ                                                                                    
Abnormal AM = λ0 + λ1AbnormalRM+ λ2PRIVATE+ λ3SUSPECT_PRIVATE + λ4SUSPECT_PUBLIC + λ5∑Control Variable of AM + λ6∑Other Controls   
                        + λ7 INV_MILLS + λ8 PRIVATE*INV_MILLS + ν                                                                                     
  Abnormal CFO Sample 
 
Abnormal PROD Sample 
 
Abnormal DISEXP Sample  Abnormal ALL Sample 
  Dependent Variable 
















Intercept  0.01 -0.035**  0.290*** 0.174***  -0.368*** -0.169***  -0.670*** 0.155*** 
  (0.73)  (-2.57)  (5.57)  (10.01)   (-7.40) (-8.00)  (-5.80) (8.79)  
PRIVATE  0.005 -0.015  -0.084*** -0.125***  0.083*** 0.106***  0.186*** -0.105*** 
  (0.83)  (-0.91)  (-3.40) (-6.34)  (3.36)  (5.51)   (3.38)  (-5.90) 
SUSPECT2_PRIVATE  -0.003 0.007  -0.003 0.015  -0.026 -0.036**  0.01 0.011 
  (-0.65) (0.70)   (-0.20) (1.39)   (-1.15) (-2.31)  (0.28)  (1.25)  
SUSPECT2_PUBLIC  -0.014*** 0.036***  0.031*** 0.037***  -0.030*** -0.014***  -0.063*** 0.027*** 
  (-6.98) (6.20)   (4.00)  (6.35)   (-3.81) (-2.84)  (-3.65) (5.51)  




































Endogenous variable             
  PredRM   -3.293***   1.669***   1.137***   -0.658*** 
   (-43.27)   (35.27)    (22.17)    (-21.45) 
  PredAM  -0.753***   3.855***   -2.557***   -8.749***  
  (-4.63)   (11.73)    (-7.35)   (-14.72)  
Common control var.             
  SIZE  -0.001 0.003**  -0.023*** -0.008***  0.027*** 0.006***  0.054*** -0.009*** 
  (-0.50) (2.16)   (-4.45) (-7.09)  (5.90)  (4.58)   (4.79)  (-8.92) 
  LEVERAGE  -0.018*** 0.058***  -0.061*** -0.079***  0.043*** 0.031***  0.059** -0.007 
  (-5.65) (6.44)   (-4.94) (-6.73)  (3.89)  (4.41)   (2.17)  (-0.98) 
  SALES_GROWTH  -0.001 -0.003  -0.084*** -0.104***  0.090*** 0.072***  0.169*** -0.085*** 
  (-0.41) (-0.54)  (-7.55) (-10.92)  (9.50)  (7.51)   (6.86)  (-9.20) 
  ROA  -0.018 0.006  0.941*** 0.030*  -0.831*** 0.133***  -2.272*** 0.139*** 
  (-0.26) (0.31)   (3.60)  (1.77)   (-4.14) (15.75)   (-3.92) (14.24)  
96 
 
  LOSS  -0.027*** 0.076***  -0.062** 0.053***  0.074*** -0.046***  0.154** 0.027*** 
  (-3.56) (7.31)   (-2.22) (6.34)   (3.15)  (-13.32)  (2.47)  (3.46)  
   INV_MILLS  0.005*** -0.010***  -0.031*** -0.044***  0.056*** 0.055***  0.082*** -0.041*** 
  (5.33)  (-4.04)  (-8.75) (-9.94)  (19.32)  (10.62)   (10.29)  (-7.89) 
   PRIVATE*INV_MILLS  -0.006 0.015  0.052*** 0.082***  -0.060*** -0.067***  -0.112*** 0.067*** 
  (-1.35) (1.35)   (3.20)  (6.32)   (-4.04) (-5.68)  (-3.11) (5.74)  
Var. for REM             
  HHI  -0.000**   0.000*   -0.000*   -0.000***  
  (-2.23)   (1.67)    (-1.81)   (-2.89)  
  OVERPRODUCE  -0.000***   0   0   -0.000*  
  (-6.44)   (1.00)    (-0.93)   (-1.76)  
  RDIndustry  -0.001   0.029***   -0.032***   -0.073***  
  (-0.71)   (4.30)    (-6.62)   (-4.80)  
  Z-score  0.001   -0.036***   0.033***   0.087***  
    (0.53)    (-3.64)   (4.19)    (3.96)   
Var. for AEM             
  SOX   -0.002   0.010***   -0.007**   0.009*** 
   (-0.58)   (3.08)    (-2.45)   (3.73)  
  LITIGATION   -0.012***   -0.045***   0.045***   -0.040*** 
   (-2.75)   (-7.98)   (8.73)    (-6.88) 
  BIG5   -0.006   -0.012**   0.002   -0.010** 
   (-1.23)   (-2.45)   (0.37)    (-2.54) 
  NOA   0.000***   0   0   0.000** 
   (4.46)    (1.31)    (0.57)    (2.52)  
             
N.   41451 41451  41616 41616  33795 33795  41614 41614 
1st stage Adj. R2 (%)  22.24% 10.37%  22.06% 7.56%  22.56% 8.08%  22.06% 7.83% 
2nd stage Adj. R2 (%)  28.45% 37.19%  8.97% 22.74%  8.16% 21.32%  12.23% 23.90% 
             
Hausman simultaneity test:           
  p-value  <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. PredRM and PredAM are predicted values of the respective endogenous variable derived from the 
first-stage least squares regression. InvMills is the inverse Mills ratio that is estimated from the probit model using factors that are related to a firm’s choice of going public 





TABLE 9 (Cont’t) 
Panel B:  Hausman Test for Simultaneity versus Sequentiality of Abnormal Accruals and Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures: Beat Firms 
The Hausman test is conducted by regressing Abnormal AM on the exogenous variables and the predicted value from the fist-stage regression and the actual Abnormal RM 
(Abnormal CFO, Abnormal PROD, Abnormal DISEXP, and Abnormal ALL). Exogenous variables are cost factors of engaging in accruals management and other firm-
specific control variables.  
 
Abnormal RM = ϕ0 + ϕ1AbnormalAM+ ϕ2PRIVATE + ϕ3∑Control Variable of RM +  ϕ4∑Other Controls + ϕ7INV_MILLS  + ϕ8PRIVATE*INV_MILLS + υ 
                                                                                                              
Abnormal AM = λ0 + λ1AbnormalRM+ λ2PRIVATE + λ3∑Control Variable of AM + λ4∑Other Controls + λ7 INV_MILLS + λ8 PRIVATE*INV_MILLS + ν  
                                                                                                             
  Abnormal CFO Sample 
 
Abnormal PROD Sample 
 
Abnormal DISEXP Sample 
 
Abnormal ALL Sample 
Variable  Dependent Variable 























  (-2.56) (6.21)  
 




(-31.28) (10.09)  











(8.62)  (0.11)  
 
(12.53)  (-7.06) 


































Endogeneous variable  
           


































Common control var.  
           











(10.32)  (-2.26) 
 
(8.37)  (-13.47) 











(-1.96) (10.60)  
 
(22.08)  (1.41)  











(12.08)  (-1.10) 
 
(17.47)  (-15.02) 







  (-0.23) (17.77)  
 
(3.58)  (9.40)  
 
(-6.09) (53.97)  
 
(80.65)  (17.10)  
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  (-20.21) (17.96)  
 
(9.61)  (11.58)  
 
(-3.25) (5.69)  
 
(-14.56) (10.58)  











(21.63)  (5.61)  
 
(66.43)  (-8.42) 







  (-3.28) (3.49)  
 




(-14.24) (6.43)  
Var. for REM  
           
































































Var. for AEM  
           































































             
             
N.   29270 29270  29391 29391  24035 24035  24035 24035 
Ist stage Adj. R2 (%)  15.71% 9.27%  15.22% 9.29%  15.94% 6.53%  15.22% 9.72% 
2nd stage Adj. R2 (%)  42.40% 46.20%  11.80% 17.80%  6.00% 15.20%  81.00% 20.50% 
             
Hausman simultaneity test:           
  p-value  <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Firms are BEAT firms if (1) net income divided by total assets is greater than or equal to 0.005, or (2) 
the change in net income divided by total assets between t-1 and t is greater than or equal to 0.005 and they are not categorized as MEET firms. PredRM and PredAM are 
predicted values of the respective endogenous variable derived from the first-stage least squares regression. INV_MILLS is the inverse Mills ratio that is estimated from the 





TABLE 9 (Cont’t) 
Panel C: Hausman Test for Simultaneity versus Sequentiality of Abnormal Accruals and Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures: Just Meet Firms 
The Hausman test is conducted by regressing Abnormal AM on the exogenous variables and the predicted value from the fist-stage regression and the actual Abnormal RM 
(Abnormal CFO, Abnormal PROD, Abnormal DISEXP, and Abnormal ALL). Exogenous variables are cost factors of engaging in accruals management and other firm-specific 
control variables.  
 
Abnormal RM = ϕ0 + ϕ1AbnormalAM+ ϕ2PRIVATE + ϕ3∑Control Variable of RM +  ϕ4∑Other Controls + ϕ7INV_MILLS  + ϕ8PRIVATE*INV_MILLS + υ 
                                                                                                              
Abnormal AM = λ0 + λ1AbnormalRM+ λ2PRIVATE + λ3∑Control Variable of AM + λ4∑Other Controls + λ7 INV_MILLS + λ8 PRIVATE*INV_MILLS + ν 
  Abnormal CFO Sample 
 
Abnormal PROD Sample 
 
Abnormal DISEXP Sample 
 
Abnormal ALL Sample 
  Dependent Variable 























  (0.07)  (0.98)  
 












  (0.22)  (0.30)  
 
(-3.69) (0.04)  
 
(3.28)  (0.47)  
 
(4.46)  (0.80)  


































Endogeneous variable  
          


































Common control var.  
          











(3.33)  (-0.67) 
 
(4.45)  (-3.40) 







  (0.33)  (2.08)  
 
(-4.82) (1.26)  
 
(-0.08) (1.57)  
 
(1.86)  (2.42)  











(4.57)  (0.12)  
 
(5.78)  (-3.03) 







  (13.99)  (1.02)  
 
(-6.26) (1.76)  
 
(1.75)  (5.31)  
 
(6.72)  (3.57)  
100 
 







  (1.55)  (0.24)  
 
(-2.57) (0.14)  
 
(0.51)  (0.88)  
 
(1.76)  (0.55)  







  (-1.19) (4.48)  
 
(-2.92) (2.76)  
 
(6.61)  (2.94)  
 
(4.18)  (3.64)  







  (0.44)  (-0.96) 
 





Var. for REM  
           
































































Var. for AEM  
           








































































             
N.   4962 4962  4976 4976  3053 3053  4976 4976 
Ist stage Adj. R2 (%)  2.19% 14.81%  2.17% 10.68%  1.66% 6.19%  2.17% 11.27% 
2nd stage Adj. R2 (%)  49.90% 42.20%  12.70% 3.70%  6.20% 1.30%  16.30% 7.10% 
             
Hausman simultaneity test:           
  p-value  <0.0001 <0.0001  0.001 0.052  0.257 0.008  <0.0001 0.126 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Firms are categorized as JUST MEET firms is if (1) net income divided by total assets is greater than or 
equal to 0.005 but less than 0.005, or (2) the change in net income divided by total assets between t-1 and t is greater than or equal to 0  but less than 0.005. PredRM and PredAM 
are predicted values of the respective endogenous variable derived from the first-stage least squares regression. INV_MILLS is the inverse Mills ratio that is estimated from the 





TABLE 9 (Cont’t) 
Panel D:  Hausman Test for Simultaneity versus Sequentiality of Abnormal Accruals and Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures: Just Miss Firms 
The Hausman test is conducted by regressing Abnormal AM on the exogenous variables and the predicted value from the fist-stage regression and the actual Abnormal RM 
(Abnormal CFO, Abnormal PROD, Abnormal DISEXP, and Abnormal ALL). Exogenous variables are cost factors of engaging in accruals management and other firm-specific 
control variables.  
 
Abnormal RM = ϕ0 + ϕ1AbnormalAM+ ϕ2PRIVATE + ϕ3∑Control Variable of RM +  ϕ4∑Other Controls + ϕ7INV_MILLS  + ϕ8PRIVATE*INV_MILLS + υ 
                                                                                                              
Abnormal AM = λ0 + λ1AbnormalRM+ λ2PRIVATE + λ3∑Control Variable of AM + λ4∑Other Controls + λ7 INV_MILLS + λ8 PRIVATE*INV_MILLS + ν 
  Abnormal CFO Sample 
 
Abnormal PROD Sample 
 
Abnormal DISEXP Sample 
 
Abnormal ALL Sample 
  Dependent Variable 





















  (0.62)  (0.35)  
 
















(0.51)  (-0.06) 
 
(1.13)  (0.31)  
































Endogeneous variable           





































           







  (-2.03) (-2.85) 
 
(0.23)  (-1.31) 
 
(2.25)  (0.09)  
 
(0.71)  (-0.61) 













(1.04)  (0.60)  











(3.84)  (0.44)  
 
(2.72)  (1.01)  







  (1.97)  (5.10)  
 
(-4.17) (0.30)  
 
(1.52)  (3.23)  
 




           
  
           







  (-0.59) (2.00)  
 
(-2.54) (0.93)  
 
(4.36)  (2.22)  
 
(3.63)  (3.34)  







  (-0.02) (0.38)  
 
(1.34)  (0.51)  
 
(-0.29) (0.27)  
 
(-1.29) (-0.46) 
Var. for REM  
           
































































Var. for AEM  
           








































































             
N.   635 635  640 640  560 560  640 640 
Ist stage Adj. R2 (%)  3.83% 5.07%  3.84% 7.48%  3.42% 9.59%  3.84% 7.48% 
2nd stage Adj. R2 (%)  28.30% 27.40%  5.60% 2.70%  9.50% 3.10%  8.80% 6.30% 
             
Hausman simultaneity test:           
  p-value  0.105 0.517  0.439 0.771  0.454 0.261  0.561 0.045 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. JUSTMISS firms are the firms with net income divided by total assets is greater than or equal to -0.005 but 
less than 0, or (2) the change in net income divided by total assets between t-1 and t is greater than or equal to -0.005 but less than 0 and (3) they are not categorized and MEET or 
BEAT firms. PredRM and PredAM are predicted values of the respective endogenous variable derived from the first-stage least squares regression. INV_MILLS is the inverse 
Mills ratio that is estimated from the probit model using factors that are related to a firm’s choice of going public with debt, but not with equity. Other variable definitions are in 




TABLE 9 (Cont’t) 
Panel E:  Hausman Test for Simultaneity versus Sequentiality of Abnormal Accruals and Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures: Miss Firms 
The Hausman test is conducted by regressing Abnormal AM on the exogenous variables and the predicted value from the fist-stage regression and the actual Abnormal RM 
(Abnormal CFO, Abnormal PROD, Abnormal DISEXP, and Abnormal ALL). Exogenous variables are cost factors of engaging in accruals management and other firm-
specific control variables.  
 
Abnormal RM = ϕ0 + ϕ1AbnormalAM+ ϕ2PRIVATE + ϕ3∑Control Variable of RM +  ϕ4∑Other Controls + ϕ7INV_MILLS  + ϕ8PRIVATE*INV_MILLS + υ 
                                                                                                              
Abnormal AM = λ0 + λ1AbnormalRM+ λ2PRIVATE + λ3∑Control Variable of AM + λ4∑Other Controls + λ7 INV_MILLS + λ8 PRIVATE*INV_MILLS + ν 
  Abnormal CFO Sample 
 
Abnormal PROD Sample 
 
Abnormal DISEXP Sample 
 
Abnormal ALL Sample 
  Dependent Variable 












 Abnormal ALL Abnormal 
AM 







  (3.66)  (-15.32) 
 
















(3.53)  (6.87)  
 
(3.44)  (11.29)  


































Endogeneous variable  
       


































Common control var.  
       











(1.29)  (5.16)  
 
(0.72)  (3.67)  







  (-5.63) (18.24)  
 
















(6.73)  (12.18)  
 
(7.76)  (13.90)  







  (1.12)  (-7.97) 
 
(-0.10) (3.38)  
 
(0.39)  (-0.93) 
 
(0.38)  (29.87)  
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  (-10.35) (18.26)  
 
(-0.42) (4.20)  
 
(11.61)  (15.52)  
 
(3.86)  (4.42)  







  (0.53)  (-2.73) 
 





Var. for REM             
































































Var. for AEM             








































































             
N.   6584 6584  6609 6609  6147 6147  6607 6607 
Ist stage Adj. R2 (%)  26.35% 7.94%  26.21% 2.82%  26.43% 15.06%  26.21% 3.27% 
2nd stage Adj. R2 (%)  16.30% 29.90%  4.10% 24.60%  17.10% 27.20%  9.40% 26.00% 
             
Hausman simultaneity test:           
  p-value  0.281 <0.0001  0.234 <0.0001  0.164 <0.0001  0.679 <0.0001 
*, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. PredRM and PredAM are predicted values of the respective endogenous variable derived from the 
first-stage least squares regression. INV_MILLS is the inverse Mills ratio that is estimated from the probit model using factors that are related to a firm’s choice of going 

























Intercept ϒ0 0.024** 0.105*** -0.181*** -0.233*** 0.024** 0.105*** -0.181*** -0.233*** 
(2.54) (5.70) (-9.23) (-6.87) (2.53) (5.67) (-9.23) (-6.85) 
PRIVATE ϒ1  -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 0.017** -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 0.015 
(-1.20) (-1.43) (-0.38) (2.06) (-1.27) (-1.10) (-0.35) (1.59) 
BEAT_ZERO_PRIVATE ϒ2 -0.019*** 0.045*** -0.029* -0.092*** 
(-3.06) (3.56) (-1.79) (-3.81) 
BEAT_ZERO_PUBLIC ϒ3 -0.027*** 0.050*** -0.020*** -0.095*** 
(-9.20) (7.88) (-3.23) (-8.55) 
BEAT_LAST_PRIVATE ϒ4 -0.001 0.000 -0.02 0.003 
(-0.38) (-0.01) (-1.61) (0.41) 
BEAT_LAST_PUBLIC ϒ5 -0.007*** 0.012*** -0.011*** -0.022*** 
(-5.85) (3.88) (-2.99) (-3.93) 
SIZE ϒ6 -0.003*** -0.003** 0.010*** 0.010*** -0.003*** -0.003** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
(-5.19) (-2.21) (6.32) (3.64) (-5.03) (-2.29) (6.35) (3.70) 
LEVERAGE ϒ7 -0.011 -0.074*** 0.027* 0.070*** -0.012* -0.072*** 0.026 0.066*** 
(-1.63) (-5.70) (1.70) (2.85) (-1.78) (-5.50) (1.64) (2.68) 
ROA ϒ8 0.074** -0.114** -0.065* 0.116** 0.075** -0.115** -0.064* 0.118** 
(2.33) (-2.45) (-1.91) (1.96) (2.34) (-2.45) (-1.91) (1.98) 
SALEGS_GROWTH ϒ9 -0.006* -0.051*** 0.095*** 0.119*** -0.005 -0.053*** 0.095*** 0.123*** 
(-1.75) (-9.26) (16.54) (12.84) (-1.50) (-9.48) (16.58) (13.11) 
NOA ϒ10 -0.001 0.001 -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.001 0.001 -0.007*** -0.006*** 
(-0.89) (0.42) (-6.34) (-2.87) (-0.88) (0.42) (-6.37) (-2.88) 
LOSS ϒ11 -0.040*** 0.052*** -0.004 -0.096*** -0.039*** 0.051*** -0.003 -0.093*** 
(-7.62) (6.65) (-0.57) (-8.99) (-7.50) (6.44) (-0.50) (-8.67) 
INV_MILLS ϒ12 0.005** -0.031*** 0.050*** 0.078*** 0.004** -0.031*** 0.050*** 0.077*** 





    F-test: ϒ2 = ϒ3 1.93 0.15 0.27 0.01 
    F-test: ϒ4 = ϒ5 8.44*** 5.04** 0.48 6.27** 
Adj. R2 9.90% 6.40% 7.00% 6.60% 9.70% 6.20% 7.00% 6.50% 
N 42,548  45,250  36,448  45,222   42,548  45,250   36,448  45,222  
*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard errors for firm clusters. I run equation (8) and (9) 
separately for meeting zero earnings benchmark and for meeting zero earnings growth benchmark samples. BEAT_ZERO_PRIVATE is one if a firm meets the zero 
earnings benchmark and is a private firms, and zero otherwise. BEAT_ZERO_PUBLIC is one if a firm meets the zero earnings benchmark and is a public equity firms, 
and zero otherwise.  BEAT_LAST_PRIVATE is one if a firm meets the zero earnings growth benchmark and is a private firms, and zero otherwise.  
BEAT_LAST_PRIVATE is one if a firm meets the zero earnings growth benchmark and is a public equity firms, and zero otherwise. All other variable definitions are in 





Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures for Zero Earnings and Zero Earnings Growth Benchmark :  























Intercept ϒ0 0.019*** 0.049*** -0.012 -0.031  
0.020*** 0.049*** -0.013 -0.03 
  
3.08 3.39 -0.45 -1.12 
 
3.1 3.34 -0.48 -1.08 
PRIVATE ϒ1  -0.003* 0.009** -0.027*** -0.021**  
-0.004** 0.012** -0.027*** -0.026*** 
  
-1.93 2.01 -2.89 -2.46 
 
-2.2 2.28 -2.9 -2.63 
BEAT_ZERO_PRIVATE ϒ2 -0.008 0.039*** -0.037** -0.085***      
  
-1.18 2.93 -2.39 -3.48 
     
BEAT_ZERO_PUBLIC ϒ3 -0.023*** 0.036*** -0.026 -0.074***      
  
-4.03 3.26 -1.62 -3.71 
     
BEAT_LAST_PRIVATE ϒ4      
0.002 -0.005 -0.019 0.007 
       
1.43 -1.5 -1.49 0.97 
BEAT_LAST_PUBLIC ϒ5      
-0.004** 0.008** -0.012 -0.017** 
       
-2.4 2.17 -1.11 -2.45 
SIZE ϒ6 -0.003*** 0 0.003 0  
-0.003*** 0 0.003 0 
  
-4.64 -0.29 0.95 -0.1 
 
-4.64 -0.31 0.97 -0.07 
LEVERAGE ϒ7 -0.007 -0.072*** -0.026 0.023  
-0.008 -0.071*** -0.027 0.019 
  
-1.12 -4.08 -1.13 0.66 
 
-1.23 -3.99 -1.17 0.54 
ROA ϒ8 0.220*** -0.367*** -0.043 0.540***  
0.223*** -0.375*** -0.038 0.555*** 
  
5.66 -6.9 -0.76 5.37 
 
5.74 -7.01 -0.67 5.51 
SALEGS_GROWTH ϒ9 -0.004 -0.026*** 0.106*** 0.070***  
-0.004 -0.027*** 0.107*** 0.072*** 
  
-0.88 -3.78 7.76 5.13 
 
-0.8 -3.89 7.83 5.25 
NOA ϒ10 0.001 -0.004** -0.002 0.006*  
0.001 -0.005** -0.002 0.006** 
  
1.42 -2.33 -1.06 1.92 
 
1.46 -2.39 -0.99 2 
LOSS ϒ11 -0.018*** 0.019*** -0.008 -0.049***  
-0.018*** 0.016** -0.006 -0.044*** 
  
-4.28 2.74 -0.86 -3.75 
 
-4.14 2.44 -0.65 -3.44 
           
Statistical Test: 
          
    F-test: ϒ2 = ϒ3  
2.77* 0.04 0.29 0.15 
     
    F-test: ϒ4 = ϒ5       
7.21*** 5.80** 0.16 4.92** 





16.10% 8.70% 3.30% 8.20% 
 
15.90% 8.50% 3.20% 7.90% 
N 
 
8,626   8,968  4,107  8,966  
 
8,626  8,968  4,107  8,966  
*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard errors for firm clusters. I run equation (8) and (9) 
separately for meeting zero earnings benchmark and for meeting zero earnings growth benchmark samples. BEAT_ZERO_PRIVATE is one if a firm meets the zero 
earnings benchmark and is a private firms, and zero otherwise. BEAT_ZERO_PUBLIC is one if a firm meets the zero earnings benchmark and is a public equity firms 
and zero otherwise.  BEAT_LAST_PRIVATE is one if a firm meets the zero earnings growth benchmark and is a private firms, and zero otherwise.  
BEAT_LAST_PRIVATE is one if a firm meets the zero earnings growth benchmark and is a public equity firms, and zero otherwise.  match each of the private equity 
firm-years with a firm-year in the public equity firm samples that are (1) in the same year, (2) in the same industry (2-digit SIC code), (3) have firm size and leverage 
within ± 25%, and (4) have the smallest propensity score difference. These procedures result in 4,484 pairs of the matched-firm years. The number of matched pairs used 





Logistic Regression of the Probability of Cutting R&D Expenditures for High Default vs. Low Default Firms 
High Default Firms 
 
Low Default Firms 
Variable Coeff. Marg. Effects  
Coeff. Marg. Effects 








































































































     












*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. I run equation (7) separately for high default firms and 
law default firms. SUSPECT_PRIVATE is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging real earnings management 
(SUSPECT2) and a private equity firm, and zero otherwise. SUSPECT_PUBLIC is one if the firm is suspicious in 
engaging real earnings management (SUSPECT2) and a public equity firm with or without publicly traded debt, and 




Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures for High Default Risk vs. Low Default Risk Firms: Full Sample 
  
High Default Risk Firms 
 






























































































































































































































































































































































                











10.02***   1.70 
 
9.47*** 




























 13,274  
 





*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard errors for firm clusters. I run equation (7) separately for high 
default firms and low default firms. SUSPECT_PRIVATE is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging real earnings management (SUSPECT2) and a private equity firm and zero, 
otherwise. SUSPECT_PUBLIC is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging real earnings management (SUSPECT2) and a public equity firm with or without publicly traded debt 





Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Real Earnings Management Measures for High Default Risk vs. Low Default Risk Firms: Propensity Score Matched-Pairs 
  High Default Risk Firms 
 



















Intercept ϒ0 0.032**  -0.003  0.014  0.044  -0.001  0.099***  -0.077  -0.128*** 
 
 
(2.53)  (-0.09)  (0.33)  (0.65)  (-0.16)  (5.05)  (-1.54)  (-3.71) 
PRIVATE ϒ1  -0.002  0.013  -0.011  -0.021  -0.004**  0.008**  -0.047***  -0.018** 
 
 
(-0.52)  (1.26)  (-0.93)  (-1.07)  (-2.00)  (1.97)  (-2.75)  (-2.38) 
SUSPECT2_PRIVATE ϒ2 -0.002  0.018*  -0.030***  -0.049**  0.003  -0.005***  -0.003  0.009** 
 
 
(-0.53)  (1.72)  (-2.60)  (-2.48)  (1.55)  (-3.23)  (-0.19)  (2.47) 
SUSPECT2_PUBLIC ϒ3 -0.016***  -0.001  0.002  -0.015  -0.001  0.006  -0.026*  -0.013* 
 
 
(-2.76)  (-0.08)  (0.12)  (-0.63)  (-0.63)  (1.60)  (-1.78)  (-1.84) 
SIZE ϒ4 -0.006***  0.008**  -0.002  -0.014*  -0.001*  -0.004***  0.007  0.004* 
 
 
(-4.26)  (2.09)  (-0.43)  (-1.94)  (-1.68)  (-3.46)  (1.49)  (1.79) 
LEVERAGE ϒ5 0.002  -0.075***  -0.039  0.029  -0.009  -0.088**  0.086  0.127* 
 
 
(0.23)  (-3.03)  (-1.32)  (0.58)  (-0.89)  (-2.19)  (1.18)  (1.71) 
ROA ϒ6 0.216***  -0.325***  -0.071  0.454***  0.503***  -0.935***  0.228  1.656*** 
 
 
(5.67)  (-5.32)  (-1.06)  (4.06)  (7.91)  (-4.99)  (1.06)  (5.12) 
SALEGS_GROWTH ϒ7 -0.011  -0.033***  0.099***  0.099***  -0.006  0.005  0.107***  -0.002 
 
 
(-1.26)  (-2.65)  (5.26)  (3.92)  (-1.19)  (0.96)  (3.52)  (-0.22) 
NOA ϒ8 0.001  -0.009**  0.002  0.011*  0.000  -0.001  -0.007  -0.001 
 
 
(0.79)  (-2.15)  (0.43)  (1.83)  (-0.09)  (-0.36)  (-1.12)  (-0.12) 
LOSS ϒ9 -0.020***  0.021**  -0.013  -0.056***  0.004  -0.005  -0.008  0.01 
 
 
(-4.56)  (2.49)  (-1.24)  (-3.39)  (0.66)  (-0.39)  (-0.40)  (0.38) 
Statistical Test:                 
    F-test: ϒ2 = ϒ3  3.68*  1.38  2.57  1.25  2.14  7.53***  1.25  7.33*** 
                 
Adj. R2  15.60%  7.70%  2.70%  6.40%  17.30%  20.10%  6.80%  17.80% 
N  2,832   2,899   2,459   2,898    4,155   4,313   617   4,312  
*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard errors for firm clusters. I run equation (7) separately for high 
default firms and low default firms. I match each of the private equity firm-years with a firm-year in the public equity firm samples that are (1) in the same year, (2) in the same 
industry (2-digit SIC code), (3) have firm size and leverage within ± 25%, and (4) have the smallest propensity score difference. These procedures result in 4,484 pairs of the 
matched-firm years. The number of matched pairs used for each of four real earnings management measure varies. . SUSPECT_PRIVATE is one if the firm is suspicious in 
engaging real earnings management (SUSPECT2) and a private equity firm and zero, otherwise. SUSPECT_PUBLIC is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging real earnings 




Before-After Analysis of Abnormal Real Earnings Management around Public Equity Offerings 
Abnormal RMt = ϒ0+ϒ1SUSPECT2i,t + ϒ2BEFORE_LT + ϒ3BEFORE_ST +ϒ4AFTER_ST+ϒ5AFTER_LT  
                           + ϒ6SUSPECT3_BEFORE_LT + ϒ7SUSPECT3_BEFORE_ST +ϒ8SUSPECT3*AFTER_ST  
                           + ϒ9SUSPECT3_AFTER_LT + ϒ10SIZEi,t  + ϒ11LEVERAGEi,t + ϒ12ROAi,t +ϒ13SALTES_GROWTHi,t    










Intercept ϒ0 0.032***  0.103***  -0.171***  -0.156*** 
 
 
(2.77)  (3.35)  (-2.65)  (-2.62) 
SUSPECT2 ϒ1 -0.003  0.006*  -0.024***  -0.015** 
 
 
(-1.42)  (1.73)  (-2.61)  (-2.20) 
BEFORE_LT ϒ2 -0.018**  -0.002  0.004  -0.004 
 
 
(-2.36)  (-0.09)  (0.20)  (-0.13) 
BEFORE_ST ϒ3 0.007  -0.015  0.016  0.033 
 
 
(0.99)  (-0.85)  (0.80)  (1.01) 
AFTER_ST ϒ4 -0.001  -0.013  -0.003  0.001 
 
 
(-0.16)  (-1.01)  (-0.19)  (0.03) 
AFTER_LT ϒ5 0.007  0.00  0.015  0.006 
 
 
(1.14)  (-0.03)  (0.83)  (0.20) 
SUSPECT3_BEFORE_LT ϒ6 -0.002  -0.034  0.02  0.03 
 
 
(-0.07)  (-1.12)  (0.58)  (0.51) 
SUSPECT3_BEFORE_ST ϒ7 -0.012  0.026  -0.04  -0.089** 
 
 
(-1.31)  (1.16)  (-1.53)  (-2.25) 
SUSPECT3_AFTER_ST ϒ8 -0.023***  0.037*  0.025  -0.056 
 
 
(-2.70)  (1.77)  (0.97)  (-1.36) 
SUSPECT3_AFTER_LT ϒ9 -0.019*  0.007  0.019  -0.02 
 
 
(-1.82)  (0.26)  (0.73)  (-0.43) 
SIZE ϒ10 -0.006***  -0.002  0.015**  0.006 
 
 
(-4.53)  (-0.68)  (2.18)  (0.96) 
LEVERAGE ϒ11 0.003  -0.148***  0.093**  0.181*** 
 
 
(0.29)  (-5.25)  (2.11)  (3.24) 
ROA ϒ12 0.307***  -0.495***  -0.018  0.744*** 
 
 
(7.19)  (-5.37)  (-0.21)  (4.95) 
SALEGS_GROWTH ϒ13 -0.015**  -0.011  0.112***  0.045** 
 
 
(-2.15)  (-1.10)  (5.27)  (2.17) 
NOA ϒ14 0.002  -0.004  -0.009*  0.002 
 
 
(1.40)  (-1.11)  (-1.72)  (0.38) 
LOSS ϒ15 -0.014***  0.023**  -0.017  -0.061*** 
  (-3.32)  (2.51)  (-1.56)  (-3.75) 
Adj. R2  16.00%  11.80%  4.00%  8.20% 
N  4,836   5,004   2,595   4,999                 
*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard errors for firm 
clusters. This is regression result of equation (10). I examine abnormal levels of cash flows, production, and discretionary 
expenses for event years (t-4, t+3) relative to the event year. The event year is 0 in the year of the public equity offering. 
BEFORE_LT is one if (t+3, t+4) and BEFORE_ST is one (t-2, t-1), and zero otherwise. AFTER_LT is one if (t+2, t+3) and 






Future Operating Performance in t+1 to Real Operating Activities Management 
AdjROAt+1=ϒ0+ ϒ1PRIVATEi,t + ϒ2RM_PRIVATEi,t+ ϒ3RM_PUBLICi,t+ϒ4SIZEi,t + ϒ5LEVERAGEi,t 
                     + ϒ6AdjROAi,t + ϒ7SALES_GROWTHi,t + ϒ8LOSSt+εi,t 
    
Dependent variable: Adj.ROAt+1 
Variable 
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*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed 
 using robust standard errors for firm clusters. This regression (equation 11) tests future firm performance consequence of 
real earnings management. In this regression, I only consider firm-year observations that have 0< IBEIt/total 
assetst<=0.005 or 0< (IBEIt+1-IBEIt)/total assetst<=0.005. Dependent variable is industry-adjusted ROA based on the same 
2-digit SIC code and the year. In this subsample, I match each of the private equity firm-years with a firm-year in the 
public equity firm samples that are (1) in the same year, (2) in the same industry (2-digit SIC code), (3) have firm size and 
leverage within ± 25%, and (4) have the smallest propensity score difference. These procedures result in 660 pairs of the 
matched-firm years. RM_PUBLICt is 1 if the observation is a public equity firms and is belong to highest quintile of real 
earnings management and 0 otherwise. RM_PRIVATEt is 1 if the observation is a private equity firms and is belong to 




Changes in Operating Performance from t-1 to t+1 to Real Operating Activities Management 
AdjCROAt-1,t+1=ϒ0 + ϒ1PRIVATEi,t + ϒ2RM_PRIVATEi,t + ϒ3RM_PUBLICi,t+ ϒ4SIZEi,t + ϒ5LEVERAGEi,t 
                            + ϒ6AdjROAi,t + ϒ7SALES_GROWTHi,t + ϒ8LOSSi,t + εi,t 
 
   Dependent variable: Adj.CROAt-1,t+1 
Variable 








Intercept  ϒ0  0.001  -0.002  -0.001  0.001 
    (0.09)  (-0.18)  (-0.08)  (0.07) 
PRIVATEt  ϒ1  0.002  0.004**  0.004*  0.003* 
    (1.07)  (2.13)  (1.90)  (1.66) 
RM_PRIVATEt  ϒ2  -0.005  -0.023  -0.034  -0.019 
    (-0.51)  (-1.20)  (-1.55)  (-0.94) 
RM_PUBLICt  ϒ3  -0.022**  -0.01  -0.036**  -0.026 
    (-2.02)  (-0.73)  (-1.97)  (-1.50) 
SIZEt  ϒ4  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.001 
    (0.28)  (0.31)  (-0.09)  (0.11) 
LEVERAGEt  ϒ5  -0.018  -0.015  -0.007  -0.016 
    (-1.06)  (-0.93)  (-0.48)  (-0.92) 
Adj.ROAt  ϒ6  -0.026  0.00  -0.05  -0.049 
    (-0.28)  (0.00)  (-0.52)  (-0.50) 
SALEGS_GROWTHt  ϒ7  -0.002  0.00  -0.003  -0.002 
    (-0.19)  (0.03)  (-0.30)  (-0.18) 
LOSSt  ϒ8  -0.023  -0.017  -0.017  -0.017 
    (-0.93)  (-0.70)  (-0.74)  (-0.74) 
           
Statistical Test:           
    F-test: ϒ2 = ϒ3    1.4  0.31  0.00  0.08 
           
N.    1,296   1,296   1,296   1,296  
Adj. R2    2.00%  1.60%  3.60%  2.30% 
*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard errors 
for firm clusters. This regression (equation 11) tests future firm performance consequence of real earnings management. 
In this regression, I only consider firm-year observations that have 0< IBEIt/total assetst<=0.005 or 0< (IBEIt+1-
IBEIt)/total assetst<=0.005. Dependent variable is industry-adjusted changes in ROA from t-1 to t+1. In this subsample, I 
match each of the private equity firm-years with a firm-year in the public equity firm samples that are (1) in the same 
year, (2) in the same industry (2-digit SIC code), (3) have ROA within ± 25%, and (4) have the smallest propensity score 
difference. These procedures result in 660 pairs of the matched-firm years. Since some observations are missing industry-
adjusted changes in ROA from t-1 to t+1, the sample for this regression is 1,296.  RM_PUBLICt is 1 if the observation is 
a public equity firms and is belong to highest quintile of real earnings management and 0 otherwise. RM_PRIVATEt is 1 
if the observation is a private equity firms and is belong to highest quintile of real earnings management and 0 otherwise. 





Panel A: Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Accruals and Firm's Ownership Type (Two Groups) 
Abnormal AM = ϒ0+ϒ1PRIVATE2i,t + ϒ2SUSPECT2_PRIVATEi,t + ϒ3SUSPECT2_PUBLICi,t + ϒ4SIZEi,t 














































































     
Statistical Test: 
    













 42,598  
 
8,604  
*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard 
errors for firm clusters. SUSPECT_PRIVATE is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging real earnings management 
(SUSPECT2) and a private equity firm and zero, otherwise. SUSPECT_PUBLIC is one if the firm is suspicious in 
engaging real earnings management (SUSPECT2) and a public equity firm with or without publicly traded debt and 
zero, otherwise. All other variable definitions are in Appendix B. For propensity-score matched sample, I match each 
of the private equity firm-years with a firm-year in the public equity firm samples that are (1) in the same year, (2) in 
the same industry (2-digit SIC code), (3) have firm size and leverage within ± 25%, and (4) have the smallest 




TABLE 18 (Con’t) 
Panel B: Cross-sectional Regressions of Abnormal Accruals and Firm's Ownership Type (Three Groups) 
Abnormal AM = ϒ0+ϒ1PRIVATE2i,t +ϒ2PUBLIC_EQUITYi,t+ ϒ3SUSPECT2_PRIVATEi,t 
                                       + ϒ4SUSPECT2_PUBLIC_EQUITYi,t + ϒ5SUSPECT2_BOTH_PUBLICi,t +ϒ6SIZEi,t +ϒ7LEVERAGEi,t    










Intercept ϒ0 0.012  -0.049*** 
  (1.33)   (-4.61) 
DEBT_ONLY ϒ1 0.003*  0.007*** 
  (1.71)   (3.66)  
EQUITY_ONLY ϒ2 0.005***  0.007** 
  (2.96)   (2.10)  
SUSPECT2_PRIVATE ϒ3 0.002  0.00 
  (1.27)   (0.00)  
SUSPECT2_PUBLIC_EQUITY ϒ4 0.009***  0.005 
  (4.91)   (1.38)  
SUSPECT2_PUBLIC_BOTH ϒ5 0.010***  0.007*** 
  (7.10)   (3.20)  
SIZE ϒ6 -0.005***  0 
  (-8.64)  (-0.14) 
LEVERAGE ϒ7 0.010**  0.036*** 
  (2.20)   (4.92)  
ROA ϒ8 0.565***  0.603*** 
  (22.90)   (14.91)  
SALEGS_GROWTH ϒ9 -0.043***  -0.023*** 
  (-12.17)  (-4.76) 
NOA ϒ10 0.004***  0.002** 
  (3.74)   (2.19)  
LOSS ϒ11 0.019***  0.018*** 
  (6.63)   (3.92)  
INV_MILLS ϒ12 -0.002  0.007** 









    F-test: ϒ3= ϒ4  7.18***  1.55 
    F-test: ϒ3 = ϒ5  13.84***  5.14** 





Adj. R2  17.80%  26.20% 
N  42,548   8626 
*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively. The t-values are computed using robust standard errors 
for firm clusters. . SUSPECT_PRIVATE is one if the firm is suspicious in engaging real earnings management 
(SUSPECT2) and a private equity firm and zero, otherwise. SUSPECT_PUBLIC is one if the firm is suspicious in 
engaging real earnings management (SUSPECT2) and a public equity firm with or without publicly traded debt and zero, 
otherwise. All other variable definitions are in Appendix B. For propensity-score matched sample, I match each of the 
private equity firm-years with a firm-year in the public equity firm samples that are (1) in the same year, (2) in the same 
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